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INTRODUCTION

They're not allowed to do it but we all did it. We wanted
some money. Colleges weren't giving you any money. I
wanted some things too. I wanted a nice pair of slacks. I
might've wanted a coat during the winter. I might've
wanted to help my mom pay some bills. These colleges,
they're not giving you any money. They're making tons of
money. They're making tons more now, I might add.'
-Charles Barkley
The recent scandal concerning Reggie Bush's acceptance of
improper benefits from a sports agent while a student-athlete at the
University of Southern California ("USC") has only served to intensify the spotlight on the National Collegiate Athletic Association's
("NCAA") longstanding policy of preventing college athletes from
financially benefiting from their athletic prowess.2 Although the
NCAA asserts that it "promote [s] and develop [s] educational leadership, physical fitness, athletics excellence and athletics participation as a recreationalpursuit," there is a severe imbalance between
the revenue generated by the NCAA from these recreational events
and the few benefits afforded to college athletes. 3 This scheme,
1. Charles Barkley Admits to Taking Agent Money While at Auburn, DAN ON THE
STREET (July 23, 2010), http://danonthestreet.com/news/2010/07/23/charles-

barkley-admits-to-taking-agent-money-while-at-auburn/.
2. SeeJim Tanner, Athletes, Agents and the NCAA: It's Time for a Fix, USA TODAY
(Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-08-04-column04_STIN.htm (discussing NCAA's recent investigations into improper agent
relationships with student-athletes and suggesting steps NCAA needs to take to
stop improprieties).
3. 2009-2010 NCAA Division I Manual, Constitution § 1.2 [hereinafter NCAA
Operating Bylaws], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdown
loads/D110.pdf (emphasis added). See Timothy Davis, IntercollegiateAthletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Realities, 25 RUTGERs L.J. 269, 278 (1994) ("The amateur/education model of intercollegiate athletics fails to acknowledge the forces

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol19/iss1/10

2

Corgan: Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept Endorsement Deals: A Soluti

2012]

STUDENT-ATHLETES TO ACCEPT ENDORSEMENT DEALS

373

which has been protected under the NCAA's stated ideals of amateurism, has been a major factor in creating the problems associated with student-athletes and sports agents today.4
Although the NCAA has condemned improprieties such as accepting money from sports agents, journalists and legal scholars
have ridiculed the NCAA for issuing harsh suspensions to studentathletes and simultaneously generating billions of dollars in revenue from college athletics. 5 Not surprisingly, a number of legal
scholars have proposed methods to diminish the discrepancy between the money generated by the NCAA and the benefits afforded
to individual student-athletes. 6 Many of these proposals, however,

have serious flaws and would likely be rejected by the NCAA and
universities. 7 Moreover, as the beneficiary of a profitable revenuegenerating scheme that enjoys tax-exempt status, the NCAA has
had little reason to create a revenue sharing system where players
and interests at play within modern day college sports. This model's disregard for
a university's financial motive in promoting the success of its athletes and of its
programs generally is simply one illustration.").
4. See Tom Farrey, Is Minimum Wage Too Much to Pay Players, ESPN (Feb. 19,
2004), http://a.espncdn.com/ncf/columns/farrey_tom/1509049.html
(discussing Nebraska Legislative Bill 688, which was passed to compensate college football
players who generate millions of dollars but are vulnerable to sports agents because players do not see money generated from on-field accomplishments); see also
Jason Beaulieu, The NCAA Racket Challenge, DAILY RECORD (Mar. 24, 2010), http://
mddailyrecord.com/generationjd/2010/03/24/the-ncaa-racket-challenge/
(arguing that NCAA has tremendous "racket" where it generates billions in revenue, but
does not pay for athletes' talent); Frank Therber, Agent Issues in College Athletics
Reflects NCAA Flaw, INDIANA DAILY STUDENT (Oct. 19, 2010, 11:24 P.M.), http://
www.idsnews.com/news/story.aspx?id=77808 (arguing that main reason behind
players accepting money from agents is industry of commercialized college athletics created by NCAA and universities by accepting multi-million dollar TV deals
and merchandising contracts).
5. See Michael P. Acain, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the Exploitation of
College Athletes, 18 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 307, 307 (1998) ("Lost in the pomp and
circumstance of traditional rivalries and growing profits is the exploitation of the
most important members of collegiate sports-the student-athletes."); see also Marc
Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men's College Basketball, 35 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 861, 861 (2002) (stating Duke University Bookstore can generate
money from selling sweat suits bearing likeness of Grant Hill who would lose eligibility if he profited from sales); see also Michael Rosenberg, Change is Long Overdue:
College Football Players Should Be Paid, SI.com (Aug. 26, 2010, 9:43 A.M.), http://
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/michaelrosenberg/08/26/pay.college/
index.html (arguing that change is long overdue for NCAA's policy of not allowing
college athletes to benefit from success they bring to NCAA).
6. For a further discussion of the other proposed solutions to the discrepancy
between the NCAA's revenue and the lack of benefits afforded to student-athletes,
see infra notes 212-273 and accompanying text.
7. For a further discussion of the flaws and complications that arise from
other solutions to the NCAA revenue discrepancy, see infra notes 214-275 and accompanying text.
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could financially benefit from the commercial giant that college
sports has become. 8
Each week, new reports surface about different college football
players engaging in inappropriate relationships with sports agents.9
In an attempt to remedy this situation, the NCAA and its coaches
have begun the process of reevaluating the rules regarding agents,
student-athletes, and amateurism."o Therefore, the NCAA, now
more than ever, may be open-minded to lowering its stance on amateurism and allowing student-athletes to receive some type of compensation." If deemed valid by the NCAA, such a proposal would
significantly reduce or eliminate the desire of college athletes to
seek benefits from sports agents.12
Accordingly, this comment contends that permitting studentathletes to accept financially beneficial endorsement deals would
significantly diminish the occurrences of student-athletes seeking
secret compensation from sports agents without reducing the
NCAA's revenue stream.13 Section II of this comment examines the
NCAA bylaws regarding amateurism, the laws governing sports
agents, the laws concerning the NCAA, the increasingly commercialized state of college athletics, past attempts to challenge the
NCAA's amateur rules, and the plague of agents offering compen8. See infra notes 149-164 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
Nebraska Legislative Bill 688 and Bloom v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 93
P.3d 621 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
9. See e.g., Josh Luchs: States Must Enforce Laws, ESPN (Oct. 14, 2010,
10:54A.M.), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5681002&campaign=
rss&source=NCFHeadlines (discussing suspended sports agent Josh Luchs' allegations that he gave money to more than thirty college football players from 19901996); see also Robbie Gillies, REiAL CiAR SPORTS (July 22, 2010, 2:46 A.M.), http:/
/www.realclearsports.com/blognetwork/rcs-sidelines/2010/07/a-solution-toncaas-agent-problem.html (noting various college football players recently found
to have accepted money from sports agents and exploring several possible solutions to NCAA agent problem); Report: john Blake Introduced Agent, ESPN (Oct. 19,
2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5704064 (announcing allegations that former University of North Carolina assistant coach John Blake introduced former Oklahoma players to agent Gary Wichard).
10. See Ronnie Ramos, What Happens Next, NCAA (July 29, 2010), http://www.
ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/201 0+news+stories/july+latest+news/what+happens+next (announcing that NCAA Amateurism
Cabinet began looking into agent problem atJune 2010 meeting).
11. See Tanner, supra note 2 ("Student-athletes who violate the rules can slip
in the professional drafts, receive smaller contracts and lose endorsements. In
light of recent events, the time is right for real and positive change.").
12. See id. (commenting on benefits of changing student-agent relationship).
13. For a further discussion of the focus of this Note, see infra notes 276-325
and accompanying text.
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sation to student-athletes who readily accept such benefits.' 4 Section III of this comment details the proposals suggested by
prominent head coaches to fix the agent problem in college sports
while also discussing the steps currently being taken by the NCAA
to resolve this issue.' 5 Section III then examines three past proposals for a payment system between the NCAA and student-athletesthe pay-for-play proposal, the laundry money model, and the revenue-sharing suggestion-all of which attempted to reconcile the
revenue discrepancy between the NCAA and student athletes.16 Finally, Section III provides a comprehensive analysis of the endorsement deal proposal while explaining how this proposal avoids the
downfalls of the other revenue sharing suggestions and also effectively combats the current agent problem in the NCAA more effectively than any of the possible solutions offered by NCAA officials
and head coaches.' 7 Section IV ultimately asserts the premise that
the NCAA will not eliminate the current agent epidemic without
implementing the endorsement deal proposal.' 8
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

The NCAA's Current Amateur Bylaws

The NCAA's bylaws regarding student-athletes were developed
under the amateur/education model.' This model enables the
NCAA to fall under the Internal Revenue Code's ("IRC") classification of a tax-exempt status. 20 The current model also allows the
NCAA to avoid workers' compensation claims and vicarious liabil14. For a further discussion of the increased commercialization of college
sports and the current problem of agents in the NCAA, see infra notes 111-148 and
accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the NCAA's and head coaches' solutions to the
agent problem, see infra notes 185-206 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the other proposals attempting to solve the
discrepancy between the NCAA's revenue and the lack of benefits given to studentathletes, see infra notes 214-275 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of why the endorsement deal plan is currently the
NCAA's best option to eliminate the agent problem, see infra notes 274-320 and
accompanying text.
18. For concluding remarks on player-agent relationships, see infra notes 321325 and accompanying text.
19. See Davis, supra note 3, at 273 (declaring that NCAA adheres to amateur/
education model, which alleges clear line between amateur and professional
athletes).
20. See Virginia A. Fitt, The NCAA's Lost Cause and the Legal Ease of Redefining
Amateurism, 59 DuKE L.J. 555, 576-85 (2009) (explaining how NCAA maintains amateur rules to keep its tax-exempt status).
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ity. 2 1 To justify this amateur model, the NCAA bylaws assert that
school athletic programs are "an integral part of the educational
program" because student-athletes are essential to the student
body, and thus quite different from professional athletes. 22
Under this system, schools can give students full tuition scholarships that include the cost of room and board.23 Moreover, the
NCAA permits college athletes to work part-time to earn additional
compensation to pay for expenses associated with going to college. 24 At these part-time jobs, employers of student-athletes can
only pay these college students wages that are "the going rate in
that locality for similar services." 25 In addition, student-athletes
may not receive more financial aid than the cost of attendance. 26
The NCAA also mandates that student-athletes cannot receive
compensation for their athletic prowess from people not associated
with the school in which the student-athlete attends.27 College athletes cannot accept the promise of money from any type of person
not associated with the school, even if the student-athlete would not
receive the compensation until after graduation.2 8 Furthermore,
student-athletes lose all remaining college eligibility once they sign
with a sports agent, even if the students do not accept any money
when signing with an agent. 29 Moreover, NCAA guidelines prohibit
student-athletes from accepting awards related to their athletic
21. For further discussion of why the NCAA's current format avoids workers'
compensation claims and vicarious liability, see infra notes 76-101 and accompanying text.
22. See NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 3, § 12.01.2 ("Member institutions' athletics programs are designed to be an integral part of the educational
program. The student-athlete is considered an integral part of the student body,
thus maintaining a clear line of demarcation between college athletics and professional sports.").
23. See id. § 12.01.4 (declaring that permissible grant-in-aid includes that
which "does not exceed the financial aid limitations set by the Association's
membership").
24. See id. § 12.4.1 (stating that student-athletes may receive compensation
"only for work actually performed").
25. Id.
26. See id. § 15.01.6 ("An institution shall not award financial aid to a studentathlete that exceeds the cost of attendance that normally is incurred by students
enrolled in a comparable program at that institution.").
27. See id. § 12.1.2(a)-(g) (listing ways in which student-athletes can lose
eligibility).
28. See id. § 12.1.2(b) (stating how student-athlete can lose eligibility even if
athlete does not accept immediate compensation while in college).
29. See id. § 12.1.2(c) (noting that contract does not even need to be legally
enforceable or include consideration for student-athlete to lose eligibility).
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skills from organizations or people unassociated with the studentathlete's school.3 0
Although these by-laws may seem quite restrictive, the NCAA
provides for several exceptions. 3' One such exception is that a student-athlete can speak to and socialize with an agent.32 To maintain compliance with NCAA by-laws, however, a student-athlete
must ensure that the agent does not provide the student with transportation or pay for any meals during such an encounter.33 Section
12.1.2.4.2 of the by-laws details that "a student-athlete may accept
prize money based on his or her place finish or performance in an
open athletics event" in an individual sport.3 4 Nevertheless, the
amount of prize money cannot exceed the individual athlete's expenses for performing in the event.3 5 Student-athletes may also try
out with a professional team, and be reimbursed for the needed
expenses to do so, as long as the trip does not extend past fortyeight hours, and the student-athlete does not participate in any
scrimmages as a representative of the professional team. 3 6 Under
certain circumstances, student-athletes may play professionally in
one sport and receive compensation while participating in a different collegiate sport. 7 In regard to college basketball players con30. See id. § 16.01.1 ("A student-athlete shall not receive any extra benefit.
Receipt by a student-athlete of an award, benefit or expense allowance not authorized by NCAA legislation renders the student-athlete ineligible for athletics competition in the sport for which the improper award, benefit or expense was
received.").
31. See infra notes 32-38 and accompany text (detailing NCAA's exceptions for
student-athletes communicating with sports agents).
32. See Overview of NCAA Bylaws GoverningAthletic Agents, NCAA (ul. 29, 2010),

http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/
2010+news+stories/july+latest+news/overview+of+ncaa+bylaws+governing+athlete+
agents (demonstrating where NCAA rules possess some flexibility on stance against
relationship between agents and students).
33. See id. (noting restrictions placed on student-athletes' ability to meet with
sports agents); see also NCAA Operating Bylaws § 12.3.1.2 (describing actions that
result in ineligibility when student-athletes meet with agents).
34. See NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 3, § 12.1.2.4.2 (asserting that exceptions exist to NCAA's general rule that student-athletes cannot be financially
compensated for participation in athletic events).
35. See id. (listing exceptions to student-athlete's capability of receiving prize
money in competition and further declaring that award money cannot come from
source other than competition sponsor).
36. See id. § 12.2.1.2 (explaining that professional teams can pay student-athlete for expenses incurred when student-athlete traveling to try-out for professional team).
37. See id. § 12.1.3 ("A professional athlete in one sport may represent a member institution in a different sport and may receive institutional financial assistance
in the second sport."); see also Chris Isidore, Amateurs at Wm: NCAA Looks Foolish
Cracking Down on Football Player Seeking Sponsorship to Compete as World Cup Skier,

CNN MONEY (Feb. 27, 2004, 3:30 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2004/02/2
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templating a professional career, the NCAA explicitly states that
college basketball players may declare for the NBA draft and return
to school if they do not sign with an agent and remove their name
from the draft by a certain date.3 8
There are also specific rules regarding when encounters between college athletes and sports agents render a student-athlete
ineligible for collegiate play."9 Section 12.3 states that a studentathlete will be ineligible "if he or she ever has agreed . . . to be

represented by an agent for the purpose of marketing his or her
athletic ability or reputation in that sport."40 This section also states
that student-athletes will lose all remaining eligibility in any collegiate sport if the student-athlete agrees to allow a sports agent to
represent the student in contract negotiations with professional
sports teams. 4 ' To avoid any improper relationships with agents,
the NCAA permits "an authorized institutional professional sports
counseling panel" to help student-athletes contemplate future career decisions related to professional sports, review contracts with
professional sports teams, and "meet with the student-athlete and
representative of professional teams." 42
B.

Laws Regulating Agent Behavior in College Athletics

In an attempt to curtail the improper relationships between
sports agents and student-athletes, numerous states, along with the
federal government and the National Football League Players Assomentary/column-sportsbiz/sportsbiz/ ("The NCAA allows athletes to be professional in one sport and still be eligible to play in college as an amateur in another
sport.").
38. See NCAA Operating Bylaws § 12.2.4.2.1.1 (a)-(c) (noting that NCAA basketball players do not become ineligible simply by declaring for NBA draft); see also
Harangody Withdraws from NBA Draft, Returns to Irish, CBS SPoRTs (June 15, 2009),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegebasketball/story/11859370 (noting that Notre
Dame junior forward Luke Harangody decided to return for senior season at Notre Dame after declaring for 2009 NBA Draft).
39. See NCAA Operating Bylaws, supra note 3, § 12.3 (explaining various
NCAA provisions restricting contact between agents and student-athletes and also
stating permissible actions by college athletes that can take place without student
losing athletic eligibility).
40. See id. § 12.3.1 (noting primary restriction that student-athletes cannot
hire agent while playing college sports).
41. See id. § 12.3.1.1 ("An individual shall be ineligible per Bylaw 12.3.1 if he
or she enters into a verbal or written agreement with an agent for representation
in future professional sports negotiations that are to take place after the individual
has completed his or her eligibility in that sport.").
42. See id. § 12.3.1.4 ("It is permissible for an authorized institutional professional sports counseling panel to: (a) advise a student-athlete about a future professional career; (c) review a proposed professional sports contract; (d) meet with
the student-athlete and representatives of professional teams .... ).
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ciation ("NFLPA"), have passed laws designed to punish agents for
inappropriate contact with college athletes.4 3

1.

The UAAA and SPARTA

In 2000, a committee at the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") established the Uniform Athlete Agents Act ("UAAA") to standardize state laws
regulating sports agents. 4 4 After the creation of the UAAA, forty

states adopted these measures to curtail "secret payments or gifts to
the athlete, [and] undisclosed payments or gifts to friends and relatives who may be in a position to influence the athlete . .. "145 The
act contains numerous provisions that were similar to other state
laws regulating sports agents, and also provided for reciprocity
among states that enacted the UAAA. 46
The UAAA generally requires an individual to register as a
sports agent in each state that the individual conducts business as
an agent.4 7 Once registered, states "may suspend, revoke, or refuse
to renew a registration for conduct that would have justified denial
of registration."4 8 In addition, Section 11 specifies that agents must
alert university athletic directors within seventy-two hours of signing
a student-athlete from the athletic director's school.4 9 Furthermore, a student-athlete may cancel a contract with a sports agent
43. For a further discussion of the state and federal laws passed in order to
regulate the behavior of sports agents, see infra notes 66-108 and accompanying
text. For a specific discussion on the regulations established by the NFLPA, see
infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
44. See Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA)

History and Status, NCAA, http://

www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCM GLOBAL CONTEXT=/ncaa/
NCAA/Legislation+and+Governance/Eligibility+and+Recruiting/Agents+and+
Amateurism/Uaaa/history.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011) (asserting that NCAA
originally asked NCCUSL to consider drafting model law in 1997, and describing
how NCCUSL finished UAAA in 2000); see also UNIFORm ATHILETE AGENTs ACT,
Prefatory Note (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/
uaaa/aaal 130.htm (giving background of UAAA before listing all of its provisions
and rules).
45. See Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA) History and Status, supra note 45 (list-

ing all forty states that have adopted UAAA in addition to District of Columbia and
U.S. Virgin Islands, and asserting justification for UAAA's adoption in forty states).
46. See id. (notifying readers of state laws concerning sports agents that influenced the creation of UAAA).
47. See UNIFORm ATHLETE AGENTS Acr § 5(a) (2000), available at http://www.
law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uaaa/aaaI130.htm ("An applicant for registration shall submit an application for registration to the [Secretary of State] in a
form prescribed by the [Secretary of State].").
48. See id. § 7(a) (describing power held by state after sports agent has registered in state and needs to renew agent license in state).
49. See id. § 11(a) (explaining provision intended to protect student-athletes
and limit ability of agent to carry on secret relationship with college student).
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within fourteen days of signing the contract without fear of paying

any financial consideration for terminating the contract.o Section
14 of the UAAA identifies agent conduct prohibited by the UAAA,
which includes providing student-athletes with "anything of value
...

before the student-athlete enters into the agency contract" and

"fail [ing] to notify a student-athlete before the student-athlete signs
.

.

. that the signing ...

may make the student-athlete ineligible to

participate as a student-athlete in that sport."5 ' To enforce this provision, section 15 declares that violators of section 14 are subject to

criminal penalties adopted by the states.52 Moreover, section 16 allows universities to sue agents who violate the UAAA. 53
Following the adoption of the UAAA, Congress passed the
Sports Agents and Responsibility Trust Act ("SPARTA") in 2004
with the hopes that it would provide sufficient regulation over
sports agents conducting business in the eight states that have not
implemented the UAAA or promulgated their own state sports
agent laws. 54 Like the UAAA, SPARTA attempts to regulate the
"unfair and deceptive acts and practices in connection with the contact between an athlete agent and a student athlete."5 5 SPARTA
contains provisions that are nearly identical to the UAAA, as it out-

lines proper procedures for agents to follow and allows universities
50. See id. § 12(a) (listing another method incorporated by UAAA to ensure
that sports agents do not take advantage of student-athletes).
51. Id. § 14.
52. See id. § 15 (creating means of enforcing provisions established in UAAA).
Although section 15 provides that violations of the UAAA can result in state criminal penalties, this section allows the individual states that adopt the UAAA to establish the severity of the criminal penalties. See id. (granting states discretion to
determine severity of criminal penalties). As a result, criminal penalties for UAAA
violations vary widely from state to state. See id. (noting varying severity of criminal
penalties state to state).
53. See id. § 16 (providing method for universities to hold agents accountable
for improper actions with student-athletes).
Damages of an educational institution under subsection (a) include
losses and expenses incurred because, as a result of the conduct of an
athlete agent or former student-athlete, the educational institution was
injured by a violation of this [Act] or was penalized, disqualified, or suspended from participation in athletics by a national association for the
promotion and regulation of athletics, by an athletic conference, or by
reasonable self-imposed disciplinary action taken to mitigate sanctions
likely to be imposed by such an organization.
Id. § 16(b).
54. See Melissa Steedle Bogad, Maybe Jeny Maguire Should Have Stuck with Law
School: How the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act Implements Lawyer-Like Rules for
Sports Agents, 27 CARDOzo L. Rv. 1889, 1889-92 (2006) (discussing SPARTA and
examining its affects on sports agents attempting to communicate and form relationships with student-athletes).
55. Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7802 (2004)
("SPARTA").
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to sue agents for violations set out in the statute. 5 6 The statute also
designates the Federal Trade Commission to enforce the provisions
of SPARTA as if it were the Federal Trade Commission Act.5 7
2.

NELPA Regulations Governing Contract Advisors and the NFL CBA

While the UAAA and SPARTA monitor the behavior of sports
agents on state and federal levels, the NFLPA also regulates agents
who represent athletes seeking contracts with National Football
League ("NFL") teams through the NFLPA Regulations Governing
Contract Advisors ("NFLPA Regulations") and the NFL Collective
Bargaining Agreement.5 8 Under the 2006 Collective Bargaining
Agreement ("CBA"), all sports agents (or contract advisors) were
required to be certified by the NFLPA to conduct contract negotiations with NFL franchises.5 9 In order to assimilate the NFLPA regulations with state and federal laws governing sports agents, section
3(a) (14) of the NFLPA Regulations mandates that sports agents
must "fully comply with applicable state and federal laws."6 o)
Through this language, the NLFPA attempts to reinforce the UAAA
and SPARTA with the goal of preventing further misconduct between sports agents and student-athletes.6'
56. See id. (listing sports agent conduct prohibited by SPARTA that mirrors
prohibitions established in UAAA).
57. See id. § 7803(b) ("The Commission shall enforce this chapter in the same
manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as
though all applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act
were incorporated into and made a part of this chapter.") (citation omitted); see
also Bogad, supra note 54, at 1906 (explaining that Federal Trade Commission has
authority to enforce SPARTA and intervene when sports agents violate SPARTA).
58. For a firther discussion of the regulations created by the NFLPA to monitor the behavior of sports agents, see infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
59. See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article VI, § 1 (2006) ("NFL
CBA") http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/cba/nfl-cba-2006-2012.
pdf (declaring that all sports agents must register with NFLPA before signing athletes and engaging in contract negotiations with NFL franchises); see also NFLPA
Regulations Governing Contract Advisors § I (amended March 2007) [hereinafter
NFLPA Regulations], http://www.titlel7.org/scott/NFL.pdf (reiterating rules established by 2006 CBA and noting how NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract
Advisors and CBA work in conjunction with one another). At the time of this
article, the 2006 CBA was the last finalized bargaining agreement between the NFL
owners and the NFLPA. See Adam Schefter, Sources: Deal to End Lockout Reached,
ESPN (July 25, 2011, 12:14 AM), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6797238/
(discussing NFL
2011-nfl-lockout-owners-players-come-deal-all-points-sources-say
collective bargaining agreement history). The newest finalized CBA occurred in
2011. See id. (reporting finalized NFL collective bargaining agreement for 2011).
60. See NFLPA Regulations § 3(a) (14) (demonstrating how NFLPA regulations were intended to supplement state and federal rules prohibiting certain conduct by sports agents in connection with student-athletes).
61. See id. (requiring compliance with SPARTA and UAAA); cf SPARTA, supra
note 55 § 7802 (revealing similar SPARTA goal). For a further discussion of the
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In addition to averting improper actions by compelling agents
to comply with state and federal laws, the NFLPA also limits agent
conduct with several of its own provisions. 6 2 Section 3(b) (2) of the
NFLPA Regulations specifically targets agents giving financial compensation to prospective professional athletes, forbidding sports
agents from "providing or offering money or any other thing of
value to any player or prospective player to induce or encourage
that player to utilize his/her services."63 Expanding upon this provision, section 3(b) (3) also prohibits contract advisors from providing money to family members of student-athletes or any other
person that could potentially influence the student-athlete to sign
with the agent. 6 4 Sections 3(b) (30) (a) and (b) even restrict agents
from speaking to individual college-athletes who are ineligible for
the NFL and "groups of prospective players in a setting where prospective players who are ineligible for the NFL Draft. .. are present
at such presentation." 65
C.

Laws Involving the NCAA and Student-Athletes

Although the various student-athlete payment systems that
have been suggested by legal scholars would allow college athletes
to benefit financially from their athletic endeavors, such proposals
would ultimately create certain legal difficulties.6 6
1.

Title IX

Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments in
1972 with the expectation that this piece of legislation would prosimilarities in purpose of the UAAA, SPARTA, and the NFLPA, see supranotes 5456 and accompanying text.
62. See SPARTA, supra note 55 § 3(b) (listing numerous agent actions prohibited by NFLPA).
63. Id. § 3(b) (2).
64. See id. § 3(b) (3) (attempting to eliminate any ambiguities by which agents
could still influence student-athletes into signing contract without any potential
repercussions for sports agents from NFLPA).
65. See id. § 3(b) (30) (a)-(b) (eliminating any potential contact between sports
agents and student-athletes that are not yet eligible for NFL Draft). The 2006 NFL
CBA declares that a student-athlete is only eligible for the NFL draft after three full
NFL seasons have been completed since the time of the student-athlete's graduation from high school. See id. (noting that NFLPA Regulations base eligibility of
student-athletes to enter NFL Draft on definition established in Article XVI of NFL
CBA). In other words, the NFLPA classifies college football seniors as NFL drafteligible, but does not consider college football juniors as eligible for the NFL draft
until after both their junior season and that year's NFL season have concluded. See
id. (concluding sports agents may only speak with college juniors at completion of
NFL season after student-athlete's third year out of high school).
66. See infra notes 67-108 and accompanying text.
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vide women with greater employment opportunities in federally financed colleges and universities.6 7 Although Title IX does not
expressly mention women's athletics, courts have broadened the
scope of its application to include women's sports in high school
and college.6 8 Title IX states, in part, that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . ."69
To comply with Title IX standards, schools must meet one of
three requirements stated in Cohen v. Brown University.7 (1 First,
schools may provide opportunities for athletics that are "substan7
tially proportionate" to the gender demographic figures. ' Second,
schools may demonstrate that they are continually striving for equal
athletic opportunities between both genders.7 2 Third, schools may
ensure that "the athletic interests and abilities of male and female
students must be equally effectively accommodated."7 " In short,
colleges must provide female student-athletes with the same athletic
opportunities as male athletes, and schools must give equal treatment to both men's and women's sports.74 Courts usually declare
that a school has violated Title IX if the proportionality prong of
the three-part test has not been met because schools, in most cir67. See Legislative History of Title IX,

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WoMEN,

http://www.now.org/issues/titleix/history.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2011) (creating timeline of events dealing with Title IX from 1972 to 2006 and denonstrating how Title IX has influenced United States during time period).
68. See Acain, supra note 5, at 346 (examining how courts have interpreted
meaning of Title IX since its inception).
69. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2011).
70. 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996). See Title IX 1979 Policy Interpretationon Intercollegiate Athletics, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, http://www2.ed.gov/about/of-

fices/list/ocr/docs/t9interp.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2011)
requirements for compliance with Title IX).

(listing

71. See Title IX 1979 Policy Interpretationon IntercollegiateAthletics, supra note 70

("Pursuant to the regulation, the governing principle in this area is that all such
assistance should be available on a substantially proportional basis to the number
of male and female participants in the institution's athletic program.").
72. See id. ("Pursuant to the regulation, the governing principle is that male
and female athletes should receive equivalent treatment, benefits, and
opportunities.").
73. Id.; see also Acain, supra note 5, at 346 ("In coming to this conclusion, the
District Court [in Cohen v. Brown University] developed the 'policy interpretation'
test consisting of three prongs: (1) substantial proportionality; (2) continuing
practice of program expansion; and (3) full and effective accommodation.").
74. See Acain, supra note 5, at 346 (discussing how courts have interpreted
Title IX).
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cumstances, would not be able to satisfy the other two prongs while
failing the proportionality test.75
2.

Employment Law and Issues

a.

Workers' Compensation
Although workers' compensation statutes vary from state to

state, courts do not hold colleges and universities responsible for
making workers' compensation payments for injuries incurred by
student-athletes in the field of play. 76 In State Compensation Insurance Fund v. IndustrialAccident Commission," the Colorado Supreme

Court concluded that the contractual agreement between a school
and a student, in which the student committed to play a certain
sport for the school in exchange for a full tuition scholarship, did
not amount to an employment contract.7 8 As the Court noted, one
can only collect workers' compensation as a result of an injury if an
employer-employee relationship exists.7 " Therefore, because the
school did not enter into an employment contract with the student
to play football, the institution had no responsibility to make workers' compensation payments after the injury occurred.80 The Court
held the employer-employee relationship did not exist because the
state institute was not running a business for profit by fielding a
college football team. 8 ' The Court further asserted that it could
not "believe that the legislature, in creating the compensation fund,
75. See id. at 346-47 ("Under present conditions it is difficult to effectively
accommodate women without first achieving gender equality. Therefore, if an institution does not comply with the proportionality aspect of the three-prong test,
the institution likely violates Title IX.").
76. See Michael J. Mondello &Joseph Beckham, Workers' Compensation and Collegiate Athletes: The Debate Over the Pay for Play Model: A Counterpoint,31 J.L. & Enuc.
293, 295-99 (2002) (providing timeline ofjudicial cases involving college athletics
and workers' compensation claims and how, over time, judicial precedent has established that universities are not responsible to make workers' compensation
payments).
77. 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957).
78. See id. at 573-74 (declaring that even though student also received compensation from university for separate job given to him by university once he came
to school to play football, job was not contingent on his ability to play football, and
therefore, no employment contract existed in regard to playing school sport).
79. See id. at 573 (citing University of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 426 (Colo.
1953)) (distinguishing prior case, which held that student was entitled to workers'
compensation because student's employment in separate job was dependent on
his continued participation on school's football team).
80. See id. (noting difference between Nemeth case and student-athlete at Fort
Lewis A&M College).
81. See id. (asserting that college did not receive direct benefit from player

because school did not field football team primarily to generate money as
business).
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intended that it be in the nature of a pension fund for all student
athletes attending our state educational institutions." 82
In the 1983 case, Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of

Trustees,83 the Indiana Supreme Court also concluded that an athletic scholarship is not the equivalent of an employment contract. 84
The Court reasoned that the football player's scholarship was not
contingent on his athletic play because the student maintained his
scholarship despite injuries that inhibited him from performing. 5
Moreover, the scholarship given to the student-athlete to play football did not constitute a method of payment, as the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") did not require the student to report such
benefits as gross income.8 6 The Court also noted that there is no
distinction between athletic and academic scholarships. 7 The university did not provide the student-athlete with a scholarship because of his "services" on the football field.8 8 Instead, universities
give athletic and academic scholarships because of "past demonstrated ability in various areas" with the hope that such financial
assistance will allow students to "pursue opportunities for higher
education as well as to further progress in their own fields of endeavor."" In other words, the contract between a student-athlete
and a university is not an employment contract or a contract to
render certain services, but rather a contract involving education.Oo
82. Id. at 574.
83. 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983).
84. See id. (declaring that college scholarships to play football do not create
employer-employee relationship between schools and student-athletes).
85. See id. at 1171 (describing agreement). The Court found:
The 'agreement' provided . . . the aid would continue even if Rensing

suffered an injury during supervised play which would make it inadvisable, in the opinion of the doctor-director of the student health service, 'to
continue to participate,' although in that event the University would require other assistance to the extent of his ability.
Id.
86. See id. at 1173 (providing further evidence that employee-employer relationship does not exist between school and student-athlete, as IRS has never recognized scholarships as income).
87. See id. (explaining that IRS also did not see any difference between scholarship given by university for academic reasons versus scholarship given for athletic
reasons).
88. See id. at 1174 (providing justification for scholarship given to studentathlete and demonstrating that athletic participation did not constitute reason for
scholarship any more than academically talented student receives scholarship to
perform well in classroom).
89. Id.
90. See id. (noting that school would be responsible for making workers' compensation payments if school gave scholarship to student for reasons unrelated to
educational mission of institute).
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Thus, universities are not required to compensate student-athletes
under workers' compensation. 9'
b.

Vicarious Liability

In its simplest terms, the doctrine of respondeat superior states
that employers are vicariously liable for the acts of their employees
that occur within the scope of their employment.9 2 Similarly, a
principle may also be found liable under a principle-agent relationship where the agent has been authorized to act on behalf of the
principle.9 3 As evidenced by the State Fund and Rensing cases,
courts have traditionally viewed athletic scholarships as educational
contracts rather than employment agreements. 9 4 Therefore, courts
have not found schools vicariously liable for the on-field actions of
its student-athletes that result in the injury of other players because
the students are not employees of the schools.9 5
Although the court in Hanson v. Kynast'6 held that a school was
not liable for the reckless act of a lacrosse player because the athlete did not receive a scholarship or any other type of benefit from
the school for participating in the sport, Justice Holmes's concurring opinion declared that a principle-agent relationship would still
not exist if the school gave the student-athlete a scholarship or
charged fees to watch the athletic event.9 7 Holmes noted, however,
that payment given to the college player from the university for the
athlete's participation in the event would represent a contractual
agreement sufficient to hold the university vicariously liable for the
91. See id. (demonstrating that person can only receive workers' compensation if he enters into employment contract). "Rensing [the injured student] did
not receive 'pay' for playing football at the University within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act; therefore, an essential element of the employeremployee relationship was missing in addition to the lack of intent." Id.
92. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 743-44 (1998) (providing

general definition of vicarious liability and exemplifying when employer is liable
for actions of employee).
93. See id. at 742-44 (noting that principle-agent relationship has many of
same duties and responsibilities as employer-employee relationship, including ability of principle to be liable for actions of agent).
94. For a further discussion of why colleges and universities are not considered employers of student-athletes who are given athletic scholarships, see supra
notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
95. For a further analysis of how courts have determined that schools are not
liable for the on-field actions of their student-athletes, see supra notes 92-94 and
infra notes 96-101 and accompanying.
96. 494 N.E.2d 1091 (Ohio 1993).
97. See id. at 1098 (asserting that school profiting from student-athlete playing
sports would not change holding that employment relationship did not exist between student-athlete and school).
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student's actions. 8 Holmes's reasoning aligns with the First Circuit's decision in Manning v. Grimsley," which declared that professional sports franchises, as employers of professional athletes, are
vicariously liable for the intentional torts of any players that occur
during the "scope of employment."' 0 0 In Manning, the court remanded the case to the district court and noted the possibility that
the Baltimore Orioles could be held liable for the actions of an
Orioles pitcher who threw a baseball and hit a fan.) 0
3.

Exemption from FederalIncome Tax

The NCAA, as an entity that qualifies under section 501 (c) (3)
of the IRC, enjoys an exemption from paying income taxes on
money generated from college athletics. 1 02 Section 501(c) (3) states
that the IRC provides a federal income tax exemption for entities
created to exclusively operate "religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition" in accordance with the IRC's definition of an amateur sports organization
in section 501(j).'1- The IRS exempts organizations from income
taxes if they meet one or more of the classifications listed in section
501 (c).104 Presumably, the IRS provides the NCAA with a section
501 tax exemption because it qualifies as an entity that exclusively
operates for "educational purposes" and "to foster national or international amateur sports competition." 0 5 Under section 501(j), the
IRS defines an amateur sports organization as an entity exclusively
98. See id. (stating that actual payment to student-athletes from school for sole
purpose of playing sports would result in employment contract between studentathletes and school).
99. 643 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1981)
100. See id. at 24 (applying Massachusetts' vicarious liability law to professional
sports franchise).
101. See id. (determining that employer, or professional sports franchise,
could be held vicariously liable for action of its pitcher because "assault was in
response to [heckling] which was presently interfering with [pitcher's] ability to
perform his duties successfully") (citation omitted).
102. See Brett T. Smith, The Tax Exempt Status of the NCAA: Has the IRS Fumbled
the Ball?, 17 SPORTs LAw.J. 117, 119-20 (2010) (explaining that IRS classifies NCAA
as tax-exempt organization because it falls under criteria established in I.R.C.
§ 501 (c) (3)).
103. I.R.C. § 501 (c) (3) (2006) (describing how entities can attain taxexemptions).
104. See id. (declaring that organizations that do not meet criteria established
in section 501 (c) (3) must pay taxes on money generated after expenses).
105. See Fitt, supra note 20, at 577 (alleging that NCAA's best argument for
tax-exempt status is under amateur athletics organization). But see Smith, supra
note 102, at 121-22 (asserting that NCAA enjoys tax-exempt status because of its
educational mission and purpose).
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created to facilitate national or international amateur sporting
events and develop amateur athletes for these events.' 0 6
Tax-exempt entities may be subject to an unrelated business
tax when the entity engages in a trade or business that is regularly
carried on and "not substantially related to further the exempt purposes of the organization."" 7 Despite the tremendous amount of
money generated by college athletics, the high salaries of coaches,

and the low graduation rates of football and basketball players, the
IRS continues to exempt the NCAA from the unrelated business
income tax ("UBIT"). 10
D.

The Commercialized State of College Sports

Although the NCAA enjoys tax exemptions as a non-profit amateur athletics organization, college sports is a major commercial
entity with schools, coaches, and NCAA officials earning millions of

dollars per year.10 9 In fact, the NCAA generates nearly $650 million
in revenue per year from television and marketing fees, championThe overwhelming
ship games, and investment fees and services.'
majority of this revenue comes from the NCAA's television contract
with CBS, which is worth $11 billion over six years."' Moreover, at
the existing rate agreed upon by CBS and the NCAA, the men's
106. See I.R.C. § 501(j) (2006) ("[A]ny organization organized and operated
exclusively to foster national or international amateur sports competition if such
organization is also organized and operated primarily to conduct national or international competition in sports or to support and develop amateur athletes for national or international competition in sports.").
107. Id. §§ 501(b), 511-14. "Except as otherwise provided in this subsection,
the term 'unrelated business taxable income' means the gross income derived by
any organization from any unrelated trade or business ... regularly carried on by it
....
Id. § 512(a)(1).
108. See Smith, supra note 102, at 128-29 (noting that NCAA has survived various challenges from IRS in regard to whether NCAA revenue generated from athletic events qualifies as "substantially related" to NCAA's educational purpose).
109. See Steve Wieberg, NCAA's Tax-Exempt Status Questioned, USA ToDAY (Oct.
5, 2006), http://www.usatoday.con/sports/colege/2006-10-04-ncaa-tax-status-x.
htm (discussing Congress asking NCAA to defend its tax-exempt status); see also
Tom Van Riper, The Highest-Paid College Basketball Coaches, FORBES.COM (Mar. 8,
2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/05/calipari-donovan-pitino-businesssports-college-basketball-coaches.html (naming NCAA basketball's highest paid
coaches and explaining schools' need to pay high salaries to remain competitive).
110. See NCAA Budgeted Revenue Chart, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCMGLOBALCONTEXT=/ncaa/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/
budget+and+finances/budget+information/current+budgeted+revenue+chart
(last visited Oct. 18, 2011) (breaking down portions of NCAA revenue).
111. See Where Does the Money Go? NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/
connect/public/ncaa/answers/ninecointsTMo@onsider one (last visited Oct. 18,
2011) (detailing NCAA's revenue stream, sources of income, and expenses and
allocation of revenue).
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basketball national championship game has the highest cost per
viewer of any sporting event in the United States, including the

Super Bowl.1 12
Many individual universities and colleges also make a substantial amount of money from college athletics.1 13 In 2010, the University of Texas's football program earned net revenue of over $65
million.' 1 4 Additionally, universities such as Georgia, Florida, Penn
State, Louisiana State, Notre Dame, and Alabama all generated net
revenues of over $38 million.1 15 In contrast, only four Division I
Bowl Championship Series ("BCS") football programs - Connecticut, Syracuse, Wake Forest, and Duke - lost money." 6 Moreover,
these figures do not include the indirect financial benefits that
schools receive from possessing successful athletic programs." 7
Wealthy alumni of schools often reward their alma maters with
huge sums of money when the schools' sports teams have successful
seasons."" Reports estimate that making the NCAA basketball
tournament field of sixty-eight increases alumni donations by an average of $450,000 per college.' 1 9 For example, after winning the
2006 and 2007 NCAA basketball championships, and the 2006 National Championship in football, the University of Florida's athletic
department received $38 million from its alumni.120
112. See id. (explaining benefits of NCAA's current television deal with CBS).
113. See Brett McMurphy, ForLonghorns, Money Grows on Football Program, Not
Trees, AOL NEws, (June 30, 2010), http://ncaafootball.fanhouse.com/2010/06/
30/for-longhorns-money-grows-on-football-program-instead-of-trees/
(listing all
BCS football program revenues in 2009); see also Matt Woolsey, It Can Pay to Lose in
College Football, FORBES.COM (Dec. 5, 2006), http://www.forbes.com/2006/12/04/
college-football-profits-biz-cx mw 1205football.html (declaring that Texas football
program grossed over $60 million in 2005, and even schools such as Washington,
Illinois, and Kentucky all generated over $19 million in revenue despite last place
finishes in their respective conferences).
114. See id. (noting that Texas's football program generates more money than
any other team by $20 million).
115. See id. (listing football programs that generate most money after Texas).
116. See id. (stating that nearly every BCS football team turned profit during
2008-09 football season, though only seventeen non-BCS teams turned profit).
117. See Brian O'Keefe, How Florida Cashed in on College Football, CNN MONEY
(Oct. 19, 2007), http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/18/news/companies/florida.gators.fortune/index.htm (discussing how Florida is most successful sports
program in country and alumni have given generous donations despite not having
"Boone Pickens-level sugar daddy"-Pickens pledged $165 to alma mater
Oklahoma State University).
118. See id. (explaining that boosters fund many building projects for athletic
facilities with costs amounting to hundreds of millions).
119. See Van Riper, supra note 109 (conducting cost-benefit analysis of hiring
high-paid college basketball coaches and financial return that schools experience).
120. See O'Keefe, supra note 117 (discussing "team behind the team" in reference to boosters who help pay for University of Florida facilities).
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Successful sports programs and famous student-athletes can
also increase the popularity of a school, which frequently leads to
increased enrollment and tuition payments to the school.1 21 Since
emerging as America's favorite Cinderella team during the 1999
NCAA basketball tournament and continuing its success with trips
to the NCAA tournament in each of the last twelve years, Gonzaga
University has become a much more popular school to attend.122
Enrollment increased from 4,500 students in 1999 to over 7,000 students in 2010.123 In addition, universities that win a Division-lA
football national championship have experienced, on average, an
eight percent increase in enrollment for the following school
year.124
Schools and conference officials around the nation have been
well aware of the potential money to be made in college sports, but
the pursuit to capitalize on such revenue has become more evident
in recent years.125 Under the NCAA's alignment, there are six automatic qualifying BCS conferences - the Big Ten, the Big XII, the
Southeastern Conference ("SEC"), the Atlantic Coast Conference
121. See Dena Potter, 'FlutieEffect'Is Real, Study Shows, HEARST (Mar. 23, 2008),
(explaining 'Flutie
http://www.seattlepi.com/cbasketball/356135-flutie24.html
Effect' named after Doug Flutie because enrollment increased at Boston College
by roughly thirty percent after Flutie threw famous 'Hail Mary' pass to beat Miami
in 1984 Orange Bowl).
122. See id. ("Inquiries [from prospective students] have jumped from about
20,000 per year to 50,000, and Gonzaga attracts students from Eastern states where
it doesn't recruit.").
123. See id. (stating that Gonzaga would not have grown in enrollment if not
for success of basketball team).
124. See id. (explaining that successful sports programs are great marketing
tool for colleges and universities to attract students). But see Mondello, supra note
76, at 301-02 (asserting that there is no strong correlation between successful
sports teams and increased enrollment and money given to universities). Monello
posits:
Those few research studies addressing these issues, particularly the relationship between athletic success and increased enrollments and endowments, have been inconclusive. For example, researchers examining links
between athletics, academics, and educational contributions to institutions could establish no relationship between athletic success and total
educational contributions in a study of eighty-seven universities covering
a ten-year period.
Id.
125. See Chase Ruttig, Why Conference Realignment Will Kill College Sports,
BiLEACHER REPORT (June 14, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/406177why-conference-realignment-will-kill-college-sports (arguing that potential conference realignment is "money grab" at expense of student education and non-revenue sports); see also Woolsey, supra note 113 (asserting many economists' notion
that "[t]elevision revenue distribution is key" to financially successful teams even if
college football teams do not have any on-field success).
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("ACC"), the Pacific 12 ("Pac-12"), and the Big East.1 2 6 Additionally, there are a number of other conferences with traditionally
smaller schools that also participate in the Football Bowl Division
(formerly referred to as Division 1-A).127
In the summer leading into the 2010 college football season,
the Big XII Conference nearly imploded when the Pac-10 attempted to create a super-conference featuring sixteen teams.1 2 8
Furthermore, in an attempt to secure their financial positions in
the college football world, both the Big Ten and SEC discussed potential conference expansion.12 9 Realizing that a sixteen team
super-conference would offer its member schools a multi-million
dollar increase in revenue through expanded television coverage
and a televised conference championship game, the Pac-10 attempted to persuade Texas - the most profitable college football
team in the country - into joining the conference. 3 0
Although Texas, Texas Tech, Texas A&M and Oklahoma considered deals with both the Pac-10 and the SEC, the Big XII was
ultimately able to entice Texas to stay by giving Texas more television revenue for its games.13 1 Oklahoma, and Texas Tech also
elected to stay in the Big XII.' 3 2 Colorado and Nebraska, however,
126. See BCS Conferences, BCS (Jan 21, 2010, 3:07 PM), http://www.bcsfootball.
org/news/story?id=4809755 (explaining formation of BCS conferences).
127. See id. (noting that all eleven football conferences in FBS are BCS
conferences).
128. See Pete Thamel, Uncertainty Marks Start ofExpansion, N.Y. TIM1s, June 11,
2010, at B12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/sports/I1colleges.
html (stating that after Colorado announced its move to Pac-10, Texas, Texas
Tech, Oklahoma, and Oklahoma State seemed likely to join them); see also Ted
Miller, Source: CU Already Has Pac-10 Invite, ESPN (June 10, 2010), http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5270048 (stating that Big XII is likely to
collapse now that Nebraska will join Big Ten).
129. See Erick Smith, SEC Will React if Big Ten Expansion Shifts Landscape of
College Sports, USA TODAY (Apr. 27, 2010), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/campusrivalry/post/2010/04/sec-will-react-if-big-ten-expansion-shifts-landscape-of-college-sports/1 (stating that SEC may attempt to add several teams to
conference if Big 10 creates fourteen to sixteen team conference).
130. See Miller, supra note 128 ("With that large population base, the new
conference would start its own network and, along with other broadcast partners,
likely would distribute around $20 million per member, comparable broadcast revenue to the Big Ten ($22 million) and SEC ($17 million)."); see also McMurphy,
supra note 113 (stating that Texas made approximately $20 million more than any
other college football program last year).
131. See Steve Wicberg, Television Deal Allows Big X1l to Survive; Pac-10 Needs
New Plan, USA TODAY (June 15, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/
2010-06-14-texas-staying-big-12_N.htm (discussing how increased television revenues given by Big XII to Texas prevents, for now, any conference realignments).
132. See Texas Move Helps Big XII Survive, ESPN (June 15, 2010), http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5286672 (announcing that Texas Tech,
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both left the Big-12 XII, as Nebraska left for the Big Ten and Colorado joined the Pac-10.m3 s Furthermore, despite its initial decision
to stay, Texas A&M ultimately announced its decision in 2011 to
move to the SEC.' 3 4 For remaining in the Big XII, Texas and
Oklahoma received new contracts that provide each school with
$20 million a year in television revenues.' 35 The Big XII also provides the remaining six teams in the conference with $14-17 million
per year, an increase of $4 to $6 million in just one season.' 3 6
The BCS conferences' realignment attempts were driven solely
by the goal of monetary gain with little regard for the pressures that
these new alignments could cause student-athletes, such as increased travel time to reach opponent schools in a different region
of the country.' 3 7 As one legal sports scholar noted, NCAA universities "have become economic competitors that collectively possess
monopsony power over the demand for college athletes and monopoly power over the supply of college games." 3 8
Oklahoma, and Texas A&M promised to stay in Big XII after Texas declared that it
would stay in Big XII).
133. See Wieberg, supra note 131 (stating that both Nebraska and Colorado
left Big XII before television contracts renegotiated with other Big XII schools); see
also Nebraska, Colorado Paying Millions to Leave Big 12 by '11, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 21,
2010), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/13990865/nebraska-colorado-paying-millions-to-leave-big-12-by-I I (explaining that Nebraska and Colorado
will give up millions of dollars by leaving Big XII Conference). After the Pac-10
added Utah to its conference in addition to Colorado, the Pac-10 officially
renamed itself the Pac-12 Conference on July 1, 2011. See Colorado and Utah Officially Join the Pac-12, CBS Sroars (July 1, 2011), http://www.calbears.com/genrel/
070111aac.html (confirming official date Pac-10 became Pac-12).
134. Ralph Russo, Texas A &M to SEC: Aggies to Join Conference in July 2012,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/

25/texas-am-sec-conference-sec_n_980244.html (announcing Texas A&M's decision to leave Big 12 and join SEC, effective July 2012).
135. See Wieberg, supra note 131 (stating that increased television revenue
and promise that Big XII would be same or more financially lucrative than Pac-10
with sixteen teams convinced Texas to stay in Big XII).
136. See id. (recognizing that other Big XII schools also received significant
increase in television revenues).
137. See Ruttig, supra note 125 ("How much class do you think the Texas
Longhorns basketball team would get during a West Coast swing in this hypothetical Pac-16."); See also Donald H. Yee, A Pro Agent's Casefor PrivatizingCollege Football,
WASHINGTON

PosT (Aug., 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/

content/article/2010/08/19/AR2010081904202.html ("The Pacific-10 Conference's luring of teams from the Mountain West and Big 12 conferences, which
caused some scrambling in June, had nothing to do with education or amateur
sports. It really didn't have anything to do with football or its traditions, either. It
had everything to do with money.").
138. Edelman, supra note 5, at 871-72 (discussing various aspects of college
sports from economic standpoint).
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NCAA officials and coaches also benefit tremendously from
college athletics.' 3 " Former NCAA Director Cedric Dempsey made
$647,000 per year before he retired in 2002.140 Additionally, in
2006, the now deceased Myles Brand earned $895,000 as President
of the NCAA.' 4 1 Salaries for head coaches are even more staggering.14 2 As of 2010, twenty-five Division I basketball coaches made
more than $1 million per year.14 3 John Calipari, who left both of
his former college teams amidst NCAA allegations of improper conduct, signed an eight-year, $32 million contract in 2009 with the
University of Kentucky to become the highest paid head coach in
college basketball. 144 Even several college athletic directors, including Ohio State's Gene Smith, make approximately $1 million per
year.145 With such large discrepancies between the amount of
money generated by college athletics and the amount of financial
benefits student-athletes receive in return, it is not difficult to see
why high profile college athletes are drawn to sports agents who can
offer them money while still in school, especially while those

139. See id. (stating that NCAA administers receive windfall because they do
not pay athletes); see also Coaches' Salaries Main Issue at NCAA Convention, ATHENS
BANNER-HERALD

(Jan.

13, 2010), http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/011310/

foo_547411225.shtml (noting that Texas coach Mack Brown and Alabama coach
Nick Saban had combined salary of nearly $10 million in 2009).
140. See Edelman, supra note 5, at 874 (discussing Dempsey's high salary and
use of private jet).
141. See Beaulieu, supra note 4 (stating that student-athletes fund large salaries of NCAA directors).
142. See Edelman, supra note 5, at 874 (stating in 2002 that "many men's basketball coaches earn [ed] more than one million dollars in total compensation per
year").
143. See Van Riper, supra note 109 (stating that high executive CEOs make
little money compared to salaries of college coaches and time spent on job).
144. See id. (explaining that leading Memphis to National Championship
Game increased Calipari's attractiveness to competitive schools and enabled him
to receive highest paid contract for coach in NCAA); see also CalipariDeal HasMany
Perks, ESPN (Apr. 1, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=40348
62 (declaring that Calipari's contract also includes country club membership of his
choice, two cars, and bonuses for reaching Sweet Sixteen, Final Four and National
Championship Game).
145. See Gene Smith Could Earn 1.2M Annually, ESPN (Sept. 30, 2010), http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5634022 (announcing that Ohio State recently made changes to Athletic Director Gene Smith's contract, which could be
worth as much as 1.2 million); see also Richard Moore, Despite Cutbacks, Collegiate
Athletics Boom (For a Few), LAKELAND TimES (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.lakeland
times.com/main.asp?SectionlD=9&SubSectionlD=9&ArticlelD=9996&TM=36791.
19 (noting Wisconsin athletic director Barry Alvarez made $781,250 during the
2008-2009 school year).
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preaching ideals of amateurism are receiving millions of dollars at
the expense of student-athletes.1 4 6
E.

Previous Challenges to the NCAA's Amateurism Rule and
Revenue-Generating Scheme By Government
Officials and Litigants

Over the course of the last quarter century, the NCAA has encountered numerous types of opposition to the NCAA's revenue
system and rules prohibiting college athletes from receiving financial compensation. 1 47 Jeremy Bloom, perhaps the most famous example of such opposition, was a high school football star and a
highly rated recruit who eventually accepted a scholarship to play
football at the University of Colorado.14 8 In addition to his talent
on the football field, Bloom was also a star skier, participating in
the 2002 Winter Olympics and finishing ninth overall in the men's
freestyle moguls.' 4 9 To finance his training and preparations for
the 2002 Olympics, Bloom accepted a number of endorsements. 5 0
Bloom was forced to drop his sponsors, however, because the
146. See Rosenberg, supra note 5 (stating that millions of dollars generated by
NCAA without compensation to student-athletes has resulted in players like Reggie
Bush accepting money from agents); see also Lonnie White, Solution Long Overdue
for Problem of Agents and College Sports, AOL NEws (July 21, 2010), http://ncaafootball.fanhouse.com/2010/07/21/solution-long-overdue-for-problem-of-agents-andcollege-sports/ (asserting that players mainly accept money because they see substantial amounts of money being made by coaches and NCAA officials for work
they do without much compensation). "Without getting too deep, the main reason why athletes get caught up accepting illegal benefits is because they feel exploited. With the NCAA generating more money than ever, skillful agents find it
easy to lure athletes with cash, gifts and other perks." Id.
147. See Pros/Cons on Pay for Play, USA TODAY (Aug. 31, 2004), http://www.

usatoday.com/sports/2004-08-31-pros-cons-pay-x.htm (quoting Nebraska Senator
Ernie Chambers); see also Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 628 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004)
(arguing that college athletes should be able to receive endorsements to finance
training for winter Olympics).
148. See Jeremy Bloom Biography, KIDzWORLD, http://www.kidzworld.com/arti-

cle/7560-jeremy-bloom-biography (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) (detailing Bloom's
accomplishments in football).
149. See Steve Dilbeck, Two-Sport Star Ready to Bloom, DAILY NEWS, Feb. 10,
2006, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/TWO-SPORT+STAR+IS+READY
+TO+BLOOM.%28Sports%29-a0142025560 (discussing Bloom participating in
then-upcoming 2006 Winter Olympics and looking back on his 2002 Winter
Olympic accomplishments); see also Isidore, supra note 37 (noting that Bloom won
World Cup in freestyle skiing in 2002 and participated in Winter Olympics during
same year).
150. See Joel Eckert, Student-Athlete Contract Rights in the Aftermath of Bloom v.
NCAA, 59 VAND. L. REv. 905, 907 (2006) (discussing events that lead to Bloom
filing suit against NCAA); see also Isidore, supra note 37 (mentioning that Bloom
had originally attempted to seek endorsement deals when he began school at
Colorado).
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NCAA refused to grant him a waiver of prohibition to continue financing his skiing pursuits while playing football. After a trial court
would not offer Bloom a preliminary injunction against the NCAA,
he chose to focus solely on football for the 2002 and 2003
seasons.151
During his time at Colorado, Bloom received All-American
freshman honors and broke several Colorado school records, including catching the longest touchdown pass in school history.15 2
The endorsement issue re-surfaced, though, when Bloom decided
to train for the upcoming 2006 Winter Olympics and accepted a
number of endorsement deals to finance his training.' 5 3 Bloom
lost his appeal of the trial court's refusal to issue a preliminary injunction and was deemed ineligible to play college football because
the acceptance of compensation through endorsements violated
the NCAA's bylaws on amateurism. 5 4
In light of such issues, the Nebraska state legislature passed Nebraska Legislative Bill 688 as an attempt to pressure the NCAA into
providing better compensation for student-athletes.' 5 5 The bill,
which Governor Mike Johanns signed into state law on April 16,
2003, mandated the University of Nebraska-Lincoln to further compensate football players. 5 6 To justify the legislation, the bill declared that student-athletes, especially football players coming from
economically poor backgrounds, are susceptible to NCAA-deemed
151. See Eckert, supra note 150, at 907 (discussing Bloom dropping sponsorship); see also Isidore, supra note 37 (explaining that Bloom attempted to overturn

case from 2002 where he sought permission to accept endorsement deals to finance skiing training while also playing football at Colorado).
152. See Dilbeck, supra note 149 (describing Bloom's accomplishments at Colorado when he focused exclusively on football).
153. See Eckert, supra note 150, at 907 (stating that Bloom realized he could
not train for Olympics without financing training through endorsements); see also
Isidore, supra note 37 (mentioning Bloom's first endorsement deal to appear in
advertisements for Equinox chain of health clubs).
154. See Eckert, supra note 150, at 907 (explaining that Bloom lost appeal of
trial court decision but court recognized that student-athletes are third party beneficiaries to NCAA and, therefore, have standing to sue NCAA).
155. See Greg Skidmore, Payment for College Football Players in Nebraska, 41

LEGIs. 319, 322-23 (2004) (explaining Nebraska state legislature's initiative to pass bill potentially mandating payment to Nebraska football players); see
HARV. J. ON

also Athletes Pay Plan in Works in Nebraska: State's Legislature Approves Proposal, EN-

(Apr. 12, 2003), http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2003/04/12/
spt.wwwsptfootlal2.html (announcing Bill Sponsor Senator Ernie Chambers's intention to "pressure NCAA to change its rules limiting how much a student can
receive").
156. See id. (listing requirements of Nebraska bill); see also Skidmore, supra
note 155, at 324 (stating that Bill did contain provision allowing compensation of
other student-athletes in addition to football players).
QUIRER
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improprieties such as receiving compensation from sources outside

the NCAA.15 7
Consequently, the bill called for a university-established stipend intended to range between $200 and $400 per month.' 5 8 Alternatives to the compensation options in the bill existed, however,
allowing Nebraska to refrain from paying stipends to its football
players if the University reduced the number of practice hours.' 5 9
Critically, Bill 688 stipulated that these types of compensation requirements would only take effect if four other states with Big XII
Conference schools ratified similar provisions.' 6 0 After Nebraska
passed its legislation against the NCAA, the California state legislature also introduced a bill that would allow student-athletes to be
compensated for the rights to their names, and hire agents to help
in such endeavors.16 Despite its efforts, the Nebraska legislature
and GovernorJohanns were unable to enforce this legislation upon
the NCAA and the University of Nebraska, as it could not attain the
requisite four other states to allow its legislation to take effect.' 6 2
F. The Current Problem with Agents in the NCAA
Current Miami Dolphins running back Reggie Bush starred on
the USC football team from 2003 to 2005, amassing 5,992 all-purpose yards and winning the 2005 Heisman Trophy for being the
157. See Skidmore, supra note 155, at 323 (stating that Bill 688 also focused
mainly on football because college football generates most money out of college
sports).
158. See id. at 324 (asserting that stipend should protect students against
"abuse by universities"); see also Kevin Maywood, Pay for Play: Should NCAA Athletes
Get Paid, CHARLESTON HERALD, July 29, 2003, available at http://www.recruitzone.
com/news.asp?ArticlelD=172 ("In its original form, the bill was to pay Nebraska
football players only the minimum federal wage ($5.15 an hour). Each player
would have been paid for 14 hours per season ($3,749).").
159. See Nui. REV. STAT. §§ 85-1, 132 (1), (10) (2003); see also Skidmore, supra
note 155, at 324 n.45 (explaining that this alternative to pay would allow studentathletes to attain part-time job to make money while in school); see Maywood, supra
note 158 ("The university was given the option to decide if the athletes should be
paid instead of it being mandatory.").
160. See Farrey, supra note 4 ("A key provision of Legislative Bill 688 is that the
university can only start doling out the cash if three other states with Big 12 teams
pass similar bills."); see also Skidmore, supra note 155, at 325-26 (determining that
four-state requirement would protect Nebraska from NCAA eligibility issues).
161. See Farrey, supranote 4 (discussing extreme difficulty of getting NCAA to
change its policies).
162. See id. (stating that legislature would not be able to force NCAA and
Nebraska to comply with statute); see also Matt Aaronson, Pay for play: Why Colleges
Should, Probably Can't and Most Likely Won't Pay Student-Athletes, MICHIGAN DAILY,
Oct. 11, 2010, http://www.michigandaily.com/content/pay-play-feature (discussing Sen. Chambers attempt to provide payments to Nebraska football players
through state legislation, and failure of bill).
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best college football player in the country.16 3 In addition to winning the Heisman Trophy, Bush was also named the AP Player of
the Year and selected as a First Team All-American in 2005.164 During his three years at USC, Reggie Bush and his teammates won
three Pac-10 Championships and two national titles.165 After investigating Bush and his family for nearly five years, however, the
NCAA placed USC on probation for four years, banned the Trojans
from post-season bowl games for two years, and limited the number
of scholarships the university could extend to future student-athletes.16 6 The NCAA's June 10, 2010 announcement also stated that
USC had to vacate all fourteen victories that Bush played in while
deemed ineligible by the NCAA.1 6 7 In justifying its sanctions
against USC, the NCAA determined that USC should have supervised Bush more closely to prevent him from receiving gifts totaling
approximately $300,000 from a sports agent.16 8
The NCAA's investigation against USC was not only focused on
Bush's improprieties.169 NCAA officials concluded that O.J. Mayo,
who played basketball at USC for one season before entering the
2008 NBA Draft, also received benefits and gifts from a "runner"
named Rod Guillory who was associated with the sports agency
163. See Bio, REGGIEBUSH.COM, http://www.reggiebush.com/#bio (last visited
Sep. 4, 2010) (noting Bush's statistics while at USC that helped earn him Heisman
Trophy).
164. See id. (listing Bush's other awards and accolades that he received while
at USC).
165. See id. (displaying championships Bush and teammates won when he was
at USC).
166. See NCAA Delivers Postseason Ban, ESPN.com (June 11, 2010, 3:03 AM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5272615 (discussing
sanctions placed on USC's sports programs).
167. See id. (stating that USC must vacate wins from December 2004 and 2005
seasons, including BSC title game win in 2005); see also University ofSouthern California Public Infractions Report, NCAA (June 10, 2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/
wcm / connect/ d28c898042cdd2 bc95 8fd5a6e282 e000/
20100610+USC+Public+Report.pdfMOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=d28c898042cdd2
bc958fd5a6e282e000 (listing penalties against USC for improper conduct of student-athletes); see also Charles Robinson & Jason Cole, Cash and Carry, YAHOO!
SPoRTs (Sept. 15, 2006), http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/football/news?slug=ysbushprobe (noting that investigation against Bush and his family began in 2005).
168. See Bush, Family by Sports Marketerfor Nearly $300,000 in Cash, Gifts, ESPN
(Nov. 1, 2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3087571 (stating
sports agency, which gave Bush and his family nearly $300,000 worth of improper
benefits, is suing Bush to recover assets after Bush signed with different sports
agency prior to NFL Draft).
169. See Lance Pugmire, NCAA Combines Investigations into USC Athletics, L.A.
TIMEs (Apr. 9, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/09/sports/sp-ncaausc9 (stating that NCAA has expanded investigation of USC's violations to include
O.J. Mayo alleged misconduct with agent).
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firm, Bill Duffy Associates ("BDA"). 170 In fact, then basketball head
coach Tim Floyd allegedly paid Rod Guillory $1,000 because Guillory convinced O.J. Mayo to attend USC. 17 ' Fortunately for USC,
the NCAA did not impose any further sanctions on USC's basketball program because USC had previously vacated all victories during the 2007-2008 basketball season and banned itself from
postseason play for one season.' 7 2
Student-athletes accepting money from agents, boosters, and
alumni is not a recent development in college sports.' 7 3 This problem, though, has become increasingly more pervasive in recent
years.' 7 4 The USC scandal involving Reggie Bush and O.J. Mayo
are only two examples of the recent problems that the NCAA has
been facing.' 75 In fact, the NCAA is currently investigating the foot170. See id. (reporting on USC violations). A "runner" is a person who is paid
by a sports agency to influence and persuade a college athlete to sign with that
sports agency. See Floyd Reportedly Paid Cash for Mayo, ESPN (May 13, 2009, 2:00
PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=4162444 (stating that BDA
allegedly paid Guillory approximately $250,000 to persuade Mayo to join BDA).
171. See Floyd Reportedly Paid Cashfor Mayo, ESPN (May 13, 2009, 2:00 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=4162444 (recounting story of
Louis Johnson, former colleague of Mayo, telling federal authorities and NCAA
that Floyd paid Guillory "a grand" to get Mayo to come to USC).
172. See NCAA Delivers Postseason Ban, supra note 166 (announcing that NCAA
would take no further action in punishing USC's basketball program).
173. See Charles Barkley Admits to Taking Agent Money While at Auburn, supra note
1 (stating that agents giving money to college-students was common practice in
1980s); see also Brandon Larrabee, Charles Barkley Took Money From an Agent 25 Years
Ago. Do We Care?, SB NATION (Sept. 17, 2010, 9:28 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/
2010/9/17/1695673/charles-barkely-money-agent-ncaa (mentioning Barkley's recent announcement that he took money from agent while in college and then
repaid agent when he earned money in NBA); see alsojeremy Fowler, College Football Has an Agent Problem, But What Does the NCAA Do About It?, ORlANDO SENTINEL
(July 28, 2010), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-07-28/sports/os-collegefootball-agents-20100727-14 1 agent-alabama-nick-saban-college-football (mentioning agent tempted Ricky Nattiel, University of Florida's star receiver in mid1980s, with $50,000 cash); See Mike and Mike in the Morning, ESPN (July 23, 2010,
9:00 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/sportscenter/post/-/id/68666/cris-cartersbiggest-regret (providing Cris Carter's discussion of improper agent interaction as
biggest regret in college); see alsoJudge Orders Webber to Pay $100,000, ESPN, (Aug.
31, 2005, 6:09 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=2148232 (stating judge ordered Webber to pay $100,000 for lying to authorities about receiving
money from booster while at Michigan).
174. See Pat Forde, CooperationKey to Solving Agent Issue, ESPN (July 30, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/columns/story?columnist=forde-pat&id=5422508
(arguing that there are several reasons why agent problem, which has seemingly
always existed in NCAA, has become "ice-berg sized" in last couple years); see also
White, supra note 146 (describing events concerning NCAA agent problems as "recent rush of rule violations allegedly committed at several major football
programs").
175. See Tanner, supra note 2 (listing all recent revelations of agent and student-athlete improprieties).
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ball programs at Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and
North Carolina, where agents allegedly gave improper gifts to several of the teams' players.' 76 Furthermore, in a recent survey conducted by ESPN, twenty prominent college basketball coaches
declared that the involvement of unethical sports agents with student-athletes is the biggest problem plaguing NCAA basketball
today.'"
Moreover, Oklahoma football coach Bob Stoops asserted in
2010 that communications between agents and student-athletes are
more prevalent now than at any time during his twelve years as a
head coach.' 78 Former Florida Head Coach Urban Meyer issued
similar sentiments, declaring that the contact between agents and
student-athletes is currently an "epidemic" in college football.' 7 9 Alabama head coach Nick Saban, whose players have been suspended
in the past for receiving improper benefits from sports agents, has
also been extremely vocal about the NCAA's problem with sports
agents. 8 0 In one interview, Saban even referred to sports agents as
"pimps."' 8 ' While the acknowledgement of this problem by the
176. See Stewart Mandel, NCAA Turns up Heat on Agent-Player Relations with
More Investigations, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 20, 2010, 10:32 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/stewartmandel/07/19/ncaa.agents/index.html
(stating that agent involvement with USC was just beginning of NCAA unearthing
improper relations with agents at North Carolina, Oklahoma State, Florida, South
Carolina, and others); see also Fowler, supra note 173 (discussing NCAA investigations against several college football teams for improper contact between studentathletes and sports agents).
177. See Tanner, supra note 2 (arguing that NCAA needs to make substantial
changes to fix agent problem, including allowing agents to openly meet with college athletes and NCAA paying student-athletes monthly stipend).
178. See Bob Stoops: Amnesty for Some Players, ESPN (Sept. 2, 2010, 12:55 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5522685 ("Stoops said the problem
with agents is worse than at any time he can remember in his 12 years as a head
coach.").
179. See Forde, supra note 174 (describing disgust felt by Urban Meyer over so
many agents approaching college football players and offering them gifts and
money).
180. See Kevin Scarbinsky, Scarbinsky: Another Year, Another Alabama FootballSuspension, BIRMINGHAM NEws (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/
2010/09/scarbinsky-another.year anothe.html (listing several football players
who have been suspended at Alabama while Nick Saban has been head coach); see
also Kelly Whiteside, Alabama Will Not Appeal Marcell Dareus' Two Game Suspension,
USA TODAY (Sept. 6, 2010), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/campusrivalry/post/2010/09/alabama-will-not-appeal-marcell-dareus-two-game-suspension/1 (announcing Alabama will not appeal NCAA's suspension of Marcell
Dareus as Saban originally stated); see also Tide's Dareus Ruled Ineligiblefor 2 Games,
ESPN (Sept. 3, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5525330
(stating that Saban has "led a movement to find ways to punish shady agents").
181. SeeJohn Zenor, Saban Compares UnscrupulousAgents to Pimps, NBC SPORTS
(July 21, 2010), http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/38347909/ns/sports-col-
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coaches is certainly an important first step, sources close to the
NCAA's investigations concerning student-athletes and sports
agents state that this problem will not end anytime soon without
drastic changes by the NCAA.82

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Solutions to the Agent Problem by the NCAA
and Head Coaches

As recent events have demonstrated how invasive the moneyexchanging relationship between sports agents and college athletes
has become, the NCAA and its coaches have finally realized that
serious changes need to be made to combat this problem."-' In the
hopes of decreasing the number of agents contacting student-athletes to offer them improper benefits, Saban - along with the assis-

tance of Meyer, Stoops, and Mack Brown of Texas - has been
spearheading discussions about this problem with the NFL, the
NCAA and the NFLPA.1 84 Further, the NCAA's Amateurism Cabinet began discussions about changing the NCAA's policy concerning student-athletes and agents.' 8 5 The deliberations between these
respective groups have not led to a publicized solution to the agent
problem, yet Saban, Stoops, and various NCAA officials have spoken to the media about the potential changes.18 6
legefootball/ (discussing Saban's reaction to recent events involving agents and
student-athletes).
182. See Forde, supra note 174 ("Most observers seem convinced that the ripples touched off by the July revelations of agent-funded parties and planes will
continue to spread.").
183. See George Dohrmann,

Confessions of an Agent,

SPORTS

ILLUSTRATED

(Oct.18, 2010), http://sportsillustrated.cun.com/201O/magazine/10/12/agent/
index.html?eref=sihp (telling story of sports agent John Luchs's recent revelation
that he paid thirty college football players); see also john Luchs: States Must Enforce

Laws, supra note 9 (summarizing Mike & Mike in Morning's interview with Luchs
and his claim that he paid dozens of college players, and that other agents and
runners commonly use this strategy as well).
184. See Nick Saban: Coaches Discussing Agents, ESPN (Aug. 26, 2010), http://

sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5501737 (stating Saban made first call to
various coaches and NFL officials to organize discussion in hopes of ending agent
problem in NCAA).
185. See Ramos, supra note 10 (announcing meetings held by Amateurism
Cabinet and future meeting dates); see also Dana O'Neil, Will Agents Get an Invite to

the Table, ESPN (July 30, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/columns/story?
columnist=oneil dana&id=5421033 ("Agent/Advisor Discussion: The cabinet began initial discussions regarding current agent and advisor legislations. The staff
provided the group background information related to current issues and trends
involving prospective and current student-athletes' use of agents and advisors.").
186. See O'Neil, supranote 185 (noting declarations made to media by various
NCAA officials). For a further discussion of the proposals by Stoops, Saban, and
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Permitting Contact Between Student-Athletes and Agents with Serious
Penalties to Unethical Agents for Violations

In the summer of 2010, Saban stated that the NFLPA should
increase its involvement in the regulation of agents tempting college athletes with money by suspending agents conducting these
deceitful operations. 8 7 Saban further declared that the current
NFLPA rules preventing agent communication with underclassmen
should be discarded. 8 8 Juniors in college football, as mandated by
the NFLPA, are unable to have contact with agents even though
they are eligible to enter the NFL draft after the completion of
their junior year season.' 8 9 As Saban alleged, allowing agents to
speak with juniors about their professional prospects would eliminate much of the illegal communication that currently transpires
between many college juniors and NFL agents, which often results
in agents providing gifts or money to juniors. 0
Expanding on Saban's suggestion, the NCAA Amateurism Cabinet, while working in conjunction with the NFLPA, has strongly
considered the possibility of implementing guidelines to allow
agents to have increased access to all student-athletes. 9 1 Indeed,
Amateur Cabinet Chair and Baylor law professor Mike Rogers indicated that legislative proposals involving changes in the NCAA's
agent policies could come as early as 2011 even though discussions
only began in June 2010.192 Although the NFLPA forbids sports
the NCAA to combat the number of agents contacting student athletes and offering them money, see infra notes 187-204 and accompanying text.
187. See Zenor, supranote 181 (discussing recent increased zeal for punishing
agents improperly contacting college football players).
188. See Bob Stoops: Amnesty for Some Players, supra note 178 (stating Saban's

belief that current NFLPA rules concerning agents create more problems for college coaches and NCAA). "I don't think we should have a junior rule. That's
where we have most of our problems because they're not allowed to talk to agents."
Id. For a further discussion of the NFLPA guidelines regulating agent communication with student-athletes, see supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
189. For a further discussion of the NFLPA's eligibility rules regarding student-athletes, see supra notes 65-65 and accompanying text.
190. See Bob Stoops: Amnesty for Some Players, supra note 178 (stressing need to
prevent "street corner" deals); see also Alabama Football and the Sports Agent Problem,

SB NATION (July 20, 2010, 9:01 AM), http://www.rollbamaroll.com/2010/7/20/
1578199/alabama-football-and-the-sports (explaining moves made by Saban in last
year such as hiring Cornerstone Sports Consulting to advise players about future in
NFL and finding good agents, and bringing certain respectable agents on campus
to meet with seniors).
191. See O'Neil, supra note 185 ("Translation courtesy of the NCAA Speak to
English Dictionary: The NCAA is considering ways to perhaps allow its athletes to
have agents.").
192. See id. ("[T]here's a good chance that there will be some legislative proposals in next year's cycle.").
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agents from contacting any college students other than seniors, current "NCAA rules allow conversations and information gathering
between agents and student-athletes," while "agreements and receiving extra benefits are not permitted."' 9 3 As interim NCAA PresidentJim Isch stated, any future policy changes regarding studentathletes and agents would focus on guaranteeing "that those student-athletes with professional athletic opportunities have the best
information at the right time to make informed decisions."194 Permissible contact between agents and student-athletes would be
purely advisory so that student-athletes with professional aspirations
might be able to make the most informed decisions about their future.195 Despite having contact with student-athletes and potentially having a roster full of undergraduate student-athletes as
clients, agents would still not be able to offer these students any
type of compensation or gifts.' 9 6 SEC commissioner Mike Silve and
Big XII commissioner Dan Beebe both agree that these are the
types of changes the NCAA needs to make to eliminate the problem
of agents giving student-athletes improper benefits.'9 7 Beebe has
even proposed providing schools with liquidated damages clauses if
agents having contracts with student-athletes act inappropriately.19 8
193. See Rachel Newman Baker, NCAA Statement on Agents Issues, NCAA (July
22, 2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcmm/connect/pubic/NCAA/Resources/
Latest+News/2010-ews§tories/July+latest-ews/NCAA§tatement+on+agentsysues
(discussing how student-athletes can effectively pursue a professional career); see
also NCAA Operating Bylaws § 12.3.4 (declaring that student-athletes may consult
with professional sports counseling panel to discuss "future professional career"
and help student-athletes in the "selection of an agent by participating in communication with those individuals who can comment about the abilities of an agent");
see also NCAA Operating Bylaws § 12.3.1.2 (explaining that student-athletes cannot
receive benefits from sports agents or loss of eligibility will result); see also Alabama
Football and the Sports Agent Problem, supra note 190 ("According to NCAA guidelines
an agent can make unlimited contact with a player with the caveat no gifts or
benefits are exchanged and there is no firm commitment made to sign.").
194. Jim Isch, Statement from Interim PresidentJim Isch on Agents Issues, NCAA
(July 29, 2010), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2010-ews§tories/July+latest-ews/
Statementfom+NCAA+Interim+President+Jim+Isch+on+agentsysues.
195. See id. (stating intended plans for dealing with agents in NCAA).
196. See id. ("[T]he membership is not likely to change its opposition to student-athletes receiving benefits from agents and advisors.").
197. See O'Neil, supra note 185 (noting proposals and suggestions from other
high level NCAA officials as to how to solve influx of agents in NCAA); see also
Dana O'Neil, NCAA S tudying Agent/Athlete Interaction, ESPN (July 30, 2010, 3:43
PM) http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5423136 (discussing various
proposals by NCAA commissioners and FBS Conference officials).
198. See O'Neil, supra note 185 ("Let agents have contracts with players and
the schools. . . . Those clauses would have a liquated damages clause, where it
would cost the agent $1 million or $2 million if they did anything that made the
player ineligible. . . . You'll promote the agents who want to do it the right way.").
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GrantingAmnesty to Schools to Report Unethical Agents

Uncovering improper relationships between agents and student-athletes is a difficult task for the NCAA because of the secrecy
between the student and agent.' 9 9 In response to this problem,
Bob Stoops suggested giving amnesty to college athletes for reporting agent misconduct instead of suspending the individual student
and penalizing the student's university. 20 0 Stoops asserted that
"l[t] he only way to really start having a chance to clean it up would
be for the NCAA to allow players to come forth and say, 'I[t]hese
20
guys and these guys and these guys are doing this, this and this."' 1
Furthermore, as Stoops noted, it seems unfair to only punish student-athletes for accepting money from agents, especially when
many of these college students come from poor families. 20 2 Colleges and universities, which are better equipped to monitor athletes than the NCAA, may be averse to conducting investigations
because the end result, if student-agent violations exist, are usually
sanctions imposed by the NCAA against the schools. 20 3 Therefore,
as Stoops explained, the NCAA must change this dynamic by incen199. See id. (explaining that it is difficult to uncover agent/student relationships because of how private these relationships normally are); see also Michael
Rosenberg, NCAA Facing Uphill Battle to Control Agents Paying Players, SPORTS ILLUS-

(Oct. 13, 2010, 2:40 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/
michael-rosenberg/10/13/ncaa.agents/index.html (contending that NCAA is basically powerless in discovering improper relationships between agents and student-athletes unless either athlete or agent tells NCAA and acts as "whistleblower").
TRATED

200. See Bob Stoops: Amnesty for Some Players, supra note 178 (explaining Stoops'

suggestions to alleviate current problems with agents that have continued to escalate in recent years).
201. Id.
202. See OU's Bob Stoops: Players Who Report Agents Should Receive Amnesty, Fox

(Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.foxsportssouthwest.com/09/02/10/OUs-BobStoops-Players-who-report-agents/landing.html?blocklD=303331 &feedlD= 3742
SPORTs

(discussing problem of sports agents in college football and how student-athletes

who do not have any other source of income in addition to their scholarships and
small stipends should not bear cost of agents providing them compensation); see
also Bill N, Eight Solutions to Fix the NCAA and Improve College Football, BLEACHFR

(July 26, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/425064-8-solutions-tofix-the-ncaa-and-improve-college-football (implying that treatment of poor college
players from economically poor areas is unfair because NCAA officials and administrators generate so much money from these athletes).
REPORT

203. See OU's Bob Stoops: Players Who Report Agents Should Receive Amnesty, supra

note 202 (explaining why colleges often turn blind-eye to improprieties at their
own school); see also White, supra note 146 (noting that athletic directors do not
want to take accountability for potential NCAA violations). "This wouldn't be a
problem if the NCAA truly made school presidents, athletic departments and
coaches accountable. It's no secret that every big-time athletic program knows the
shady characters who hang around the school's athletes." Id.
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tivizing students and universities to eradicate the agent problem in
4
college football. 201
B.

The Downfall of NCAA and Head Coaches' Suggestions to
Eliminate the NCAA Agent Problem

Although the various suggestions proposed by the NCAA Amateurism Cabinet and head coaches may decrease the frequency with
which agents improperly exchange money with student-athletes,
these types of suggestions would not curtail the NCAA's agent problem to any large degree. 205 The regulations suggested would only
serve to moderately alleviate the predicament without eliminating
the root cause of the problem. 20s State and federal laws (UAAA
and SPARTA) already exist that mandate extreme punishments for
sports agents that improperly contact student-athletes or provide
student-athletes with financial benefits. 20 7 Furthermore, college
athletes who are revealed to have taken money from agents face
multiple game suspensions and possible expulsion from the
NCAA.2 08 Despite these intimidating sanctions, both agents and
student-athletes continue to violate NCAA regulations. 209 These
improper behaviors persist between agents and student-athletes be204. See OU's Bob Stoops: Players Who Report Agents Should Receive Amnesty, supra

note 202 (explaining rationale behind Stoops' proposal to grant amnesty to student-athletes engaging in improper behavior with agents).
205. For a further discussion on the reasons why the NCAA and head coach
solutions to the agency problem fail, see infra notes 206-211 and accompanying
text.
206. See Tanner, supra note 2 (arguing that rules prohibiting agent contact
with student-athletes will not be completely effective because temptation still exists
for students to take money from agents).
207. See Bob Stoops: Amnesty for Some Players, supra note 178 ("State laws in-

tended to protect the amateurism of college athletes have had little effect. An
Associated Press review found that more than half of the 42 states with sports agent
laws have yet to revoke or suspend a single license, or invoke penalties of any
sort."). See also Alan Scher Zagler, AP Study: Laws for Sports Agents Rarely Enforced,
DENVER POST (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.denverpost.com/sports/ci_15804970
(asserting that state laws against sports agents have been ineffective for several reasons including lack of available state funding to enforce such laws and lack of time
to prosecute such matters because prosecutors are too busy with more important
matters such as "bank robbers and rapists"). See also Rosenberg, supra note 199
(declaring that it took NCAA so many years to conclude investigations against Reggie Bush, USC basketball, and Michigan basketball because "the NCAA doesn't
have a lot of options for prosecution").
208. See Paul Newberry, Georgia'sA.j Green suspendedfor 4 games, NBC

SPORTS

(Sept. 8, 2010), http://scores.nbcsports.msnbc.com/cfb/story.asp?i=20100909035
838050000101&ref=hea&tm=&src= (announcing that NCAA suspended Green for
giving jersey to agent in exchange for $1,000).
209. See Analyzing NCAA Hypocrisy: Root Cause and Solutions, BLEACHER

REPORT

(June 28, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/412841-ncaa-hypocrisy-rootcause-and-solutions (contending that NCAA's main purpose "is to maximize

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol19/iss1/10

34

Corgan: Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept Endorsement Deals: A Soluti

2012]

STUDENT-ATHLETES To ACCEPT ENDORSEMENT DEALS

405

cause many student-athletes cannot resist the money given to them
despite the potential consequences, and agents will continue to pay
college athletes as long as there is potential money to be made. 210
Thus, student-athletes, especially those from economically poor
backgrounds, will continue to accept improper compensation from
agents until they find other means of receiving similar
compensation.2 1 1
C.

Various Revenue Sharing Proposals Between the NCAA,
Schools, and Student-Athletes

The increased commercialization of college sports with little
additional benefit to student-athletes has enraged many legal scholars. 2 12 It has also prompted numerous articles urging the NCAA to
change its amateurism rules to allow compensation for student-athletes. 2 1 3 Although none of these articles specifically focus on the
agent problem in college sports as the reason for adopting such
changes, it is not difficult to see why different forms of payment
would prevent student-athletes from accepting benefits from
agents. 2 1 4 Ultimately, however, all of these proposals have failed to
effectively persuade the NCAA to change its revenue system because of the various problems they create. 215

money for itself and member colleges," which is "done at the expense of the student athletes, without whom none of this money would be generated").
210. See White, supra note 146 ("As long as an athlete has potential to earn
money playing professionally, you can count on someone trying to work their way
into the picture.").
211. See Dan Wetzel, Why the Case vs. UNC Matters, RIvALs (Sept. 30, 2010),

http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/football/news?slug=dw-agents093010 ("It's been a
mostly fruitless effort because star players are walking lottery tickets ready to be
cashed. No NCAA rule will ever stop the wheels of capitalism.").
212. See David E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender ofAmateur-

ism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. Rv. 329, 353-54 (2007) ("Without studentathletes, the NCAA could not pursue its commercial goals or realize any of its
economic objectives. Simply put, college players are the raw materials comprising
the most essential ingredient of any NCAA sports product."). For a further discussion of the legal scholars opposed to the current NCAA revenue scheme, see infra
notes 216-273 and accompanying text.
213. For a further discussion of the various payment plans to student-athletes,
see infra notes 216-273 and accompanying text.
214. See infra notes 216-273 and accompanying text (discussing overview of
agent problems in college sports).
215. For a further discussion of the reasons why these payment models fail to
influence the NCAA to make any changes to its current revenue scheme, see infra
notes 218-277 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012

35

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 10

406
1.

VILLANOVA

SPORTS

& ENT.

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19: p. 371

The Pay-for-Play Model

The basic pay-for-play model asserts that schools should compensate student-athletes for their participation in college sports by
providing college athletes with a monthly stipend.2 16 Numerous legal scholars have justified this payment proposal by calling attention to the inequality between revenue gained by the NCAA and the
lack of compensation given to athletes.2 1 7 Ultimately, the pay-forplay model has a number of serious practical and legal consequences that prevent it from being a viable alternative to the
NCAA's current system. 218 First, although a number of universities
generate millions of dollars through football and basketball programs, schools utilize this revenue to fund other unprofitable
sports.2t 9 Consequently, although numerous schools would be able
to afford to pay all student-athletes a monthly stipend, a large number of schools would be forced to cut other men's sports to even
consider paying stipends to both men and women student-athletes
216. See Thomas R. Hurst & J. Grier Pressly, Payment of Student Athletes: Legal
and PracticalObstacles, 7 Vii-. SPORTs & ENT. L.J. 55, 57-60 (2000) (discussing basic
aspects of pay-for-play model); see alo Tim Wendel, Pay the Players, USA ToDAY
(Mar. 20, 2005), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-03-20ncaa-edit_x.htm (explaining main elements of pay-for-play model as "modest compensation" on a frequent basis that NCAA has continually rejected as destroying
integrity of NCAA amateur sports).
217. See Nathan McCoy & Kerry Knox, Flexing Union Muscles - Is it the Right
Game Plan for Revenue Generating Student-Athletes in Their Contest for Benefits Reform
with the NCAA, 69 TENN. L. Rvv. 1051, 1060 (2002) C'[S] ome authors suggest that
compensating student-athletes in some form or fashion introduces a measure of
fairness into an otherwise inequitable system. Various means of compensation
have been suggested, from paying salaries to receiving profits from revenue-sharing plans."); see also Hurst, supra note 216, at 59 (stating that many scholars assert
that student-athletes should receive compensation because large number of college athletes have no spending money and little financial support from relatives).
218. For a further discussion of the practical and legal consequences of the
pay-for-play model, see infra notes 218-252 and accompanying text.
219. See Doug Lederman, A (Money) Losing Proposition,INSIDE HIGHER ED (May
16, 2008), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/05/16/ncaa (stating that
although men's basketball and football programs are known for making money
and supporting other college sports programs, even many of these basketball and
football teams are losing money in today's poor economy); see also Aaronson, supra
note 162 ("And even for schools that have profitable football and basketball programs, the money earned goes primarily toward paying student scholarships and
subsidizing the non-revenue sports."); see also Moore, supra note 145 (stating that
Wisconsin's football program had $89 million in revenue from 2008-2009 football
season but was only "in the black" by $100,000 because of expenses paid to
coaches, administrators and financial support given to other unprofitable sports);
see also Matt Hayes, Despite NCAA Concessions, Pay for Play is Wrong, SPORTING NEWS
(May 14, 2001), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_ml208/is_20-225/ai_748
00763/ (mentioning that University of Florida's athletic budget for 2000-2001 season was $44 million but would only have surplus of $400,000 after expenses).
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that could total millions of dollars. 220 While scholarship cuts could
help schools solve their potential financial woes, this proposed financial solution would eliminate opportunities for male athletes in
sports such as wrestling and baseball, which have already been drastically reduced by schools to remain in compliance with Title IX.221
To resolve this situation, scholars have proposed to only pay
students participating in profitable sports, such as men's football
and men's basketball. 22 2 By implementing this plan, a greater number of universities would be able to afford paying stipends to approximately 100 students (eighty-five football players and fifteen
male basketball players) rather than 100 male athletes and 100 female athletes. 223 Nonetheless, solving the practical problem of allowing more schools to afford such a payment proposal would likely

conflict with Title IX.22 4
Title IX mandates that colleges and universities must provide
female student-athletes with the same athletic opportunities as male
athletes, and schools must give equal treatment to both men's and
women's sports. 225 Accordingly, providing male football and bas220. See Acain, supra note 5, at 349-50 (attempting to remedy revenue-sharing
proposal by stating that men's football program can decrease in size, and eliminating other men's sports completely); see also Maywood, supra note 158 (displaying
calculations that paying all 361,175 college athletes with $2,000 stipend would cost
over $722 million annually).
221. See Graham Watson, Title IX Puts Schools in Conundrum, ESPN (July 14,
2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=4326021 (declaring that
Northern Iowa had to eliminate its baseball program to maintain equal amounts of
scholarships between male and female sports); see also Ann Coulter, Title IX Defeats
Male Sports, USA TODAY (July 25, 2001), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/
2001-07-25-ncguest2.htm (arguing that Title IX actually discriminates against male
sports); see also Aaronson, supra note 162 (stating former Michigan athletic director and former president of U.S. Olympic Committee Bill Martin's insinuation that
schools would be forced to cut sports programs if Congress ever ordered NCAA
and universities to pay student-athletes some type of compensation).
222. See Hurst, supra note216, at 72 (discussing proposals to only pay stipends
to student athletes in sports generating money).
223. See College Football Players, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/college-football/

players, (last visited on Oct. 21, 2011, (listing all FBS schools with links to rosters
that generally show eighty-five players on each team); see also Men's Basketball,
DUKE UNIVERSrry, http://www.goduke.com/SportSelect.dbml?SPSID=22727&SPID
=1845&DBOEMID=4200&QSEASON=2009 (last visited on Oct. 21, 2011), (listing fourteen players on 2009-2010 roster); See Hurst, supra note 216, at 72 (noting
that there are usually eighty-five players on football team).
224. See Acain, supra note 5, at 352 (discussing requirements of Title IX and
stating that "it is unlikely that female student-athletes would have the same opportunities as their male counterparts to share in the revenues they generate").
225. See Kristine Mueller, No Control Over Their Rights of Publicity: College Athletes
Left Sitting the Bench, 2 DEPAULJ. SioRTs L. & CONTEMr. PRons. 70, 95 (2004) ("Ti-

tle IX not only requires universities to provide equal opportunities for participation in athletic programs, it also requires the schools to provide equal treatment
and benefits for all student-athletes.").
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ketball players with stipends would probably constitute unequal
treatment between male and female student-athletes. 226 Thus, the
pay-for-play model would create financial difficulties for a large
number of college programs and leave college programs in noncompliance with Title IX if programs attempted to alleviate these
financial woes. 2 27
In addition, schools and student-athletes alike could face tax
implications from the disbursement of monthly stipends to college
athletes. 228 While currently a tax exempt entity, the NCAA would
most likely lose this status by paying student-athletes for on-field
play.2 29 If schools began paying student-athletes, it is likely that the
IRS would no longer classify the NCAA as an organization that promotes amateur athletic competition because the student-athletes
would essentially become professional athletes. 2 () Even if the
NCAA remained a tax-exempt organization under Section
501 (c) (3) because of its role in fostering educational opportunities
for student-athletes, it is likely that the IRS would no longer exempt
the NCAA from unrelated business income tax, as directly paying
student-athletes for athletics does not seem "substantially related"
to the reasons why it is tax exempt.2 31

226. See Hurst, supra note 216, at 75 ("If the stipend proposal were adopted
and the universities began paying stipends to student-athletes in revenue-producing sports, with a proportionate number of female student-athletes in order to
comply with Title IX, a student-athlete in a non-revenue sport potentially could
mount an Equal Protection challenge against a university.").
227. See id. (describing problems that arise from pay-for-play model as comment urges NCAA to adopt laundry money proposal).
228. See Hurst, supra note 216, at 75 (stating that schools and players would
face tax issues once schools begin paying students just like regular employees); see
also C. Peter Goplerud III, Stipends for Collegiate Athletes: A PhilosophicalSpin on a
ControversialProposal,5 KAN. J.L. & Pun. Po'Y 125, 129 (1996) (contending that
payment to student-athletes would also create tax implications for college athletes
just as payment in form of stipend to graduate assistants creates tax consequences
for graduate students even though normal scholarship would have no tax
implications).
229. See Hurst, supra note 216, at 75 (explaining IRS's treatment of colleges
and universities).
230. See id. at 73-74 (asserting belief that university payments to students
would change tax-status under IRC).
231. See id. (explaining that income derived from sports would not be considered in pursuit of educational purposes if schools began to pay student-athletes);
see also Goplerud, supra note 228, at 131 (noting high probability that schools
would see tax implications from paying stipends to student-athletes, which would
result in "significant price tags" for universities and substantial income lost from
current amount generated).
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Paying student-athletes would also change how workers' compensation affects the NCAA. 23 2 Currently, student-athletes do not
qualify for workers' compensation because it is only available to employees, and courts have declared that student-athletes are not considered "employees" of their schools. 233 To support workers'
compensation, employers continually pay into a fund in case any of
their employees injure themselves. 23 4 Colleges and universities
have saved a tremendous amount of money by not paying into the
workers' compensation fund to compensate student-athletes if they
are injured or killed.2 35 If schools decided to provide stipends to
student-athletes, then courts, as Justice Holmes noted in Hanson,
would most likely consider student-athletes "employees" because
universities would effectively be paying the athletes just like any
other employee. 236 As a result, university revenues would decrease
from paying both stipends and workers' compensation.23 7
As employees of the universities, student-athletes would also

hold the right to a collective bargaining agreement under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").235 Consequently, the NCAA
232. See infra notes 233-237 and accompanying text (detailing how workers'
compensation could be imposed upon NCAA).
233. See Mondello, supra note 76, at 295-300 (giving history of student-athlete
workers' compensation cases and stating that colleges do not currently pay workers' compensation to athletes); see also Charlotte M. Rasche, Can UniversitiesAfford
to Pay for Play? A Look at Vicarious Liability Implications of Compensating Student Athletes, 16 REv. LITIG. 219, 231-36 (1997) (declaring that current cases have determined that student-athletes should not receive workers' compensation).
234. See Employers' Guide to Workers' Compensation, LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH
DIVISION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS (August 2008), http://www.laborcommission.utah.gov/IndustrialAccidents/Publications/pdfs/Employers%2OGuide.pdf
(describing workers' compensation program); see also Workers' Compensation - The
Workers' Comp Service Center,WORKESCOMPENSATION.cOM, http://www.workerscompensation.com (last visited Oct. 21, 2011) (providing various workers' compensation rules for all states).
235. See Rasche, supra note 233, at 238 (discussing athletic programs' revenues, none of which are given to student-athletes).
236. See Hurst, supra note 216, at 70 (stating that "wage earners" are employees); see also Goplerud, supra note 228, at 128 (mentioning possibility that stipends
to student-athletes could create workers' compensation responsibilities for colleges
and universities); see also Mondello, supra note 76, at 298-99 (noting that previous
courts have justified not making schools responsible for workers' compensation to
student-athletes because scholarships are not equivalent to pay, which suggests that
providing stipends to student-athletes would create workers' compensation responsibilities for schools); see also Rasche, supra note 233, at 246 ("There is a risk that
some types of compensation in excess of the current allowable scholarship would
affect the athlete's relationship with the university, including eligibility for
worker's compensation benefits and the potential liability of the university for the
tortious conduct of the athlete.") (citation omitted).
237. See Hurst, supra note 216, at 70 (asserting that employee designation creates workers' compensation responsibilities for employer).
238. See id. (declaring that employees hold right to unionize under NLRA).
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would not solely determine these newly instituted stipends, practice
hours, or transfer rules, as the NCAA would need to meet with the
student-athletes' collective bargaining representative to negotiate
the terms of these arrangements. 2 3 9 Schools, as employers of student-athletes, would effectively create a principal-agent relationship
in which the schools would likely be vicariously liable for certain
actions by student-athletes. 240 This scenario is similar to the Baltimore Orioles in Manning v. G'imsley where the Orioles were potentially liable for the actions of a pitcher who hit a fan with a
baseball. 24 1 Thus, as employers of student-athletes, schools would
likely be liable for intentional torts during the scope of the studentathlete's employment. 2 42 Given the frequency of injury in sports,
however, courts would probably not hold a school vicariously liable
for the injury caused by a school's student-athlete that was not intentional or grossly negligent. 243
2.

The Revenue-Shaing Plan

The revenue-sharing plan, a variation of the pay-for-play
model, contends that college sports teams should share profits with
student-athletes by giving college athletes a percentage of the revenue generated by an individual athlete's respective team.2 44 Gener239. See id. at 70-71 (explaining that employees would be entitled to collective
bargaining representatives that could negotiate with schools over numerous
issues).
240. See Rasche, supra note 233, at 220 (implying that payment to studentathletes would open schools to further liability of actions taken by studentathletes).
241. See Manning v. Grimsley, 643 F.2d 20, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1981) (applying
Massachusetts's vicarious liability law for employers to professional sports
franchise).
242. See Rasche, supra note 233, at 243 ("If a student athlete were to receive
excess compensation in a form that would result in employee status under respondeat superioranalysis, the next step is to determine the athlete's scope of employment."); see also Steven I. Rubin, The Vicarious Liability of ProfessionalSports Teams for
on-the-Field Assaults Committed by Their Players, I VA. J. SPowrs & L. 266, 283 (1999)
("[P]rofessional sports is the type of employment that fosters, and indeed demands, aggressiveness and even violence, and that employers thus should be held
vicariously liable for their employees' tortious assaults ....
).
243. See Hurst, supra note 216, at 76 (stating that schools would probably only
be held liable for grossly negligent acts of student-athletes because sports, by their
nature, invite injury); see also Rubin, supra note 242, at 269-72 (asserting that there
is "assumption of risk" associated with sports because sports are violent in nature
and injuries are frequent, which leads to notion that teams are not liable for all
injuries that result from on-field play).
244. See Acain, supra note 5, at 352-53 (advocating implementation of revenue-sharing plan for colleges and student-athletes to decrease discrepancy between revenue of athletic programs and small scholarship amounts given to
student-athletes); see also Mueller, supra note 225, at 88-90 (explaining basic concept of revenue-sharing proposal).
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ally, scholars assert that student-athletes should receive a portion of
the net profits generated by each team so that teams, which lose
money overall, would not lose more money by distributing a portion of the gross revenue to student-athletes. 24 5 Therefore, studentathletes playing on teams that fail to produce a net profit would not
receive additional compensation for their efforts. 246
Several types of arrangements can be made under a revenuesharing system between players and schools.2 4 7 First, some scholars
contend that revenue should be distributed based on seniority.24 8
In other words, each successive grade level would receive a greater
percentage of the revenue generated by a team.2 49 Second, proponents of the revenue sharing plan suggest that players who perform
well during postseason play should receive a higher portion of
money generated from these games than during the regular season
because post-season games are usually more lucrative to schools. 25 0
Third, scholars assert that Academic All-Americans should receive
larger awards from the NCAA. 25 ' Fourth, revenue-sharing proponents contend that student-athletes should share in the endorsement and licensing agreements given to schools. 25 2 For example,
the University of Notre Dame signed a ten-year deal with Adidas
245. SeeAcain, supra note 5, at 337 (asserting that revenue-sharing plan "considers the relative costs associated with each sport" so sports still possess enough
money to run program); see also Mueller, supra note 225, at 88 (noting that players
would receive percentage of net revenue of team).
246. SeeAcain, supra note 5, at 337 ("[I]f a certain team, for some reason fails
to make any profit for that school year, each student-athlete on that team would
rely on their scholarship as their sole means of compensation.").
247. See id. at 338-42 (discussing simple revenue sharing from season, postseason changes to revenue-scheme, post-season award bonuses, and
endorsements).
248. SeeAcain, supra note 5, at 338 ("[E]ach player in his or her fourth year of
participation would receive 1% of all revenues generated for that year; (2) each
player in his or her third year would receive 0.75%; (3) each player in his or her
second year would receive 0.5%; (4) each player in his or her first year would
receive 0.25% of the revenue.").
249. See id. at 307 (declaring that seniors would receive highest percentage of
compensation and freshman would receive least amount of money from revenue).
250. See id. at 338-39 (asserting that players should receive thirty-five percent
of playoff revenue and such revenue should be distributed among players by performance from games, not seniority); see also Mueller, supra note 225, at 88-89 (explaining that revenue would be apportioned differently during playoff and postseason games).
251. See Acain, supra note 5, at 340 (rationalizing increased financial amount
of award by stating that NCAA should emphasize academics, and thus reward student-athletes who excel in classroom).
252. See id. at 34142 (declaring that student-athletes should receive thirty-five
percent of licensing agreements and twenty percent of revenue from school
endorsements).
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worth approximately $60 million in 2005, which specified that
Adidas would supply Notre Dame's twenty-six varsity sports with
Adidas practice and game apparel.2 5 3 Under the terms of a revenue-sharing plan instituted by the NCAA, Notre Dame would share
a portion of the cash provided to the university with studentathletes.2 54
The revenue-sharing plan possesses many of the same
problems as the basic pay-for-play model. 255 Universities and colleges would certainly save money by limiting payments to players on
those teams that generate money.2 56 Like the pay-for-play model,
though, this type of payment plan would probably violate Title
IX. 257 Although several women's teams have posted net profits over
the thirty-eight years since Congress enacted Title IX, profitable women's teams are a rare occurrence even with successful teams.25 8
With so few women's teams generating any type of revenue, female
student-athletes would almost never receive compensation under
the revenue-sharing scheme.2 59 Thus, this plan would violate Title
253. See Notre Dame Signs 10-year, $60M Deal with Adidas, ESPN (Nov. 9, 2005),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=2218912 (declaring that Adidas began supplying Notre Dame with merchandise in 1997).
254. See Mueller, supra note 225, at 88-90 (explaining basic concept of revenue-sharing proposal).
255. See Edelman, supra note 5, at 883 (noting that complying with Title IX
while possessing enough money to pay both male and female athletes would be
extremely difficult).
256. See Hurst, supra note 216, at 71-72 (stating that schools would have to
spend twice as much by paying women athletes and complying with Title IX).
257. See Mueller, supra note 225, at 95-96 (stating that schools would have to
compensate both male and female athletes equally in order to comply with Title
IX); see also Edelman, supra note 5, at 883 ("[A]ny university that provides revenue
to its male student-athletes must provide it to an equal proportion of its female
athletes.").
258. See Acain, supra note 5, at 352 (declaring that University of Connecticut
women's basketball team made $800,000 in net revenue during 1996-1997 season);
see alsojohn Maher, Growing Deficit's in Women's Programs StrainingBudgets, STATESMAN (Apr. 3, 2010), http://www.statesman.com/sports/growing-deficits-inwomens-programs-straining-budgets-514843.html (stating that only three NCAA
women's basketball programs made money in 2004 while twenty-eight women's
basketball programs lose more than two million dollars); see alsoJeremy Brown,
Should Student-Athletes Like Tim Tebow Be Paid for Endorsements, BLEACHER REPORT
(Jan. 14, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/111022-should-student-athletes-like-tim-tebow-be-paid-for-endorsements (stating that Tennessee Lady Volunteers going to women's basketball championship games actually increases expenses
and losses for Tennessee athletic program).
259. See Acain, supra note 5, at 352 (admitting that women would not share in
same opportunities as male athletes under revenue-sharing scheme because women's sports rarely generate profits); see also Edelman, supra note 5, at 883
("[M]ale student-athletes account for a significant percentage of revenue-generation, as men's basketball and football are the two NCAA sports with multi-million
dollar television contracts. However, it is unlikely that Title IX would allow schools
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IX because it would not afford women "equal opportunities" to
share in revenue. 260
Even without any Title IX implications, many schools would
still not be able to afford a revenue-sharing scheme because, as
noted earlier, a number of colleges use the proceeds from revenue
generating sports such as football and basketball to fund all other
unprofitable sports. 26 1 Additionally, as wage earners of the universities, student-athletes would probably still fall under the classification of "university employees."2 62 As a result, employment and
taxation issues would plague schools implementing the revenuesharing plan. 263
3.

Laundry Money

The laundry money proposal is another variation of the payfor-play model that eliminates several problems that plague the
original model. 264 This proposal declares that schools should provide all student-athletes - both male and female - with a certain

amount of spending money amounting to less than the monthly
stipend proposed under the basic pay-for-play model yet still substantial enough to allow students to eat-out or go to the movies.2 6 5'
Proponents of the laundry money proposal usually suggest a
monthly payment of thirty to fifty dollars. 26 6
to provide student-athletes in these sports with a revenue share reflective of percent generated.") (citation omitted).
260. See Hurst, supra note 216, at 71-73 (declaring that female student-athletes
could win equal protection challenges against schools implementing payment
plans that generally exclude compensation to female student-athletes); see also
Maher, supra note 258 (mentioning that average NCAA men's basketball program
made over $1 million in net revenue while average women's basketball program
lost more than $1.5 million during 2007-2008 season).
261. See Steve Berkowitz, Few Athletics Programs in Black; Most Need Aid, USA

TODAY (May 16, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2008-05-16-financial-study N.htm (stating that only nineteen of 119 FBS athletic programs
turned profit in 2006).
262. See Mueller, supra note 225, at 92-94 (arguing that paying student-athletes would create employer/employee relationship between students and schools
that would result in greater expenses for schools such as workers' compensation).
263. See id. (stating that compensating student-athletes creates serious
problems for schools).
264. See Hurst, supra note 216, at 78-82 (arguing that laundry money proposal
solves problems of revenue-sharing and pay-for-play models). But see Mondello,
supra note 76, at 301 (contending that laundry money proposal still creates many
problems for colleges and universities).
265. See Mondello, supra note 76, at 301 (discussing laundry money proposal
to pay all student-athletes of university).
266. See Hurst, supra note 216, at 78 (stating that thirty to fifty dollars would
be appropriate and affordable as laundry money); see also McCoy, supra note 217,
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Providing compensation to both male and female students
would undoubtedly alleviate any compliance problems with Title
IX. 26 7 Also, by only distributing thirty to fifty dollars per month to
students, some scholars estimate that the laundry money proposal
would only cost colleges and universities an extra $100,000 per
year.26 8 As a small increase in the amount of money given to student-athletes in addition to money for room and board, tuition
fees, and books, the laundry money proposal would not constitute
compensation to employees because this type of financial benefit
would fall under the athletic scholarship umbrella.269 As a result of
this classification, colleges would avoid all of the issues concerning
taxes and employment implications that plague the pay-for-play
model and the revenue-sharing plan. 270
Despite its benefits, the NCAA and its schools would probably
encounter problems with this model as well. 27 ' Although some
scholars contend that thirty to fifty dollars per month would satisfy
a student-athlete's need for further compensation, other legal
minds contend that schools would need to distribute a higher
amount of money that would ultimately be financially inconceivable
for many schools. 272 Furthermore, assuming thirty to fifty dollars
meets a student's need, $100,000 in additional expenses would still
create a tremendous financial burden for many schools because
many athletic programs operate at a net loss. 27 3
at 1061-62 (contending that laundry money proposal suggests payment between
thirty and fifty dollars).
267. See Mueller, supra note 225, at 94-95 (asserting that Title IX compliance
necessitates equal payment among male and female athletes); see also Hurst, supra
note 216, at 79 (stating that laundry money model avoids Titles IX issues encountered by basic pay-for-play model).
268. See Hurst, supra note 216, at 79 (asserting that reasonable amount of
laundry money would only cost $100,000 per year for each collegiate institute).
269. See id. ("Unlike a stipend payment, which resembles a wage for services
rendered, the amount would represent 'laundry money' such as was allowed in the
1970s and would fall under the new NCAA definition of 'athletic scholarship,'
along with tuition, fees, room, board and books.").
270. See McCoy, supra note 217, at 1061-62 (summarizing benefits of laundry
money proposal over pay-for-play model, including avoidance of tax, Title IX, and
workers' compensation issues).
271. See Mondello, supra note 76, at 301 (asserting that laundry money model
would be too costly for many schools); see also Edelman, supra note 5, 884-85 (discussing various problems that would probably occur if NCAA and universities implemented laundry money proposal).

272. See Mondello, supra note 76, at 301 (stating that appropriate laundry
money could cost universities up to $540,000 per year for each college).
273. See NCAA Report: Economy Cuts Into Sports, ESPN (Aug. 23, 2010), http://

sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5490686 (announcing that only fourteen
of 120 FBS schools turned profit in 2010 compared to twenty-five in 2009); see also
Berkowitz, supra note 261 (asserting that overwhelming majority of FBS schools
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The Endorsement Deal Model - The Optimal Approach

While the suggestions proposed by the NCAA and its head
coaches fail to eliminate the incentives for student-athletes to receive compensation from sports agents, the pay-for-play model and
the revenue-sharing plan also fall short because of the practical and
legal consequences inherent in the implementation of these
plans.2 7 4 Moreover, although the laundry money proposal avoids
the legal implications of the other student-athlete payment methods, this plan would not succeed in eliminating the agent problem
for the same reason as the NCAA's proposals.2 7 5 Providing studentathletes with thirty to fifty dollars per month (or $360 to $600 a
year),would not lessen the desire for poor student-athletes to accept
thousands of dollars from sports agents.2 7 6 Allowing student-athletes to seek lucrative endorsement deals, though, would avoid the
legal and practical implications preventing universities from implementing the other student payment proposals while also providing
an ample amount of money to the type of successful athletes that
are approached by willing sports agents. 27 7 Accordingly, the endorsement deal model is the optimal approach.
1.

Alleviating the Agent Problem in the NCAA

By permitting student-athletes to seek and accept endorsement
deals, the NCAA would essentially eliminate the need for studentathletes to improperly accept money from sports agents. 2 78 Playing
in commercialized sports with fan bases that are often larger than
operated at loss in 2006); see also Brown, supra note 258 (arguing that colleges
cannot afford to pay any further type of compensation to student-athletes).

274. See Edelman, supra note 5, at 83 (discussing problems of revenue-sharing
scheme). For a further discussion of the shortcomings of the pay-for-play model
and revenue-sharing plan, see supra notes 218-263 and accompanying text.
275. See Edelman, supra note 5, at 883-84 (stating that hundreds of thousands
to millions of dollars will deter student-athletes from accepting gifts from agents).
276. See id. at 885 (contending that even giving $2,000 to athletes is insignificant when compared to amounts of money generated by college sports, amounts
of money to be made in U.S. professional leagues, and millions of dollars in endorsement deals for professional athletes).
277. See Rosenberg, supra note 5 (asserting that "[a]s long as college students
need money and agents are willing to pay them . . ." NCAA will not be able to
eliminate improper contact, which implies that endorsement deals, as means of
eliminating need for student-athletes to accept money from agents, should alleviate agent problem).
278. See Dohrmann, supra note 183 (alleging that student-athletes usually approach agents because they want to be paid and need money). Dohrmann stated:
One of the misconceptions about the agent business is that the kids are
victims, preyed on by people like me. When Alabama coach Nick Saban
and others rail against the agent business, they don't mention that most
of the time the player or someone from his family approaches us. Guys
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most professional teams, many prominent college athletes are more
popular than famous professional athletes in the United States. 2 79
For example, former Florida Heisman Trophy winning
Quarterback Tim Tebow, now the starting quarterback for the Denver Broncos, had the number one selling jersey among all NFL players before he played a single snap in a regular season NFL game. 280
Tebow's fanfare, though, has nothing to do with his play for
the NFL's Denver Broncos. 2 8' Rather, Tebow's immense popularity
originates from his tremendous success as a college athlete at Florida where he won two national championships and scored a total of
145 touchdowns.2 82 To put Tebow's college popularity in perspective, the Davie-Brown index, an independent marketing research
tool, determined that Tebow was more popular than New England
Patriots Quarterback Tom Brady, a three time Super Bowl Champion and one of the most recognizable faces in professional
sports.28 3 Since the Broncos drafted Tebow with the twenty-fifth
pick in the 2010 NFL Draft, Tebow has signed endorsement deals
with both Nike and EA Sports, and has reportedly turned down
other seven-figure endorsement deals in order to concentrate on
his role as an NFL quarterback.28 4
Tebow is also not the only professional player to sign endorsement deals purely on his popularity and play as a college athlete.2 8 5
see that one of their teammates has some cash, ask him about it, and
suddenly my phone rings.
Id.
279. See Tim Tebow: A Different Kind of Superstar, GACK SPORTS, http://www.
gacksports.com/4887/tim-tebow-a-different-kind-of-superstar/ (last visited Oct. 21,
2011) (stating that Tebow has become the "Golden Boy of the NFL" despite only
holding reserve role for Denver Broncos).
280. See id. (describing craze for Tebow among football fans).
281. See id. (stating that Tebow's immense popularity originates from enigmatic personality and success at Florida); see also Dave Krieger, Tebow Boosts
BroncomaniaBefore FirstSnap, DENvER POST (July 18, 2010), http://www.denverpost.
com/sports/ci_15542032 (noting Tebow's immense popularity has not only led to
his jersey selling more than any other NFL jersey, but also to his own shoe deal
with Nike before he even started playing for Broncos).
282. See Peter Finney Jr., Tebow Turns Cincy into Gater Bait, N.Y. POST (Jan. 2,
2010), http://www.nypost.com/p/sports/college/football/tim-sugar-rush_Xngs
mvHjXXD9zXso3OIvNJ (stating that Tebow holds NCAA record for most touchdowns scored in career).
283. See Tim Tebow Says He Has Turned Down 'Seven-Figure' Endorsement Deals,
HUFFINCTON POST (May 13, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/13/

tim-tebow-says-he-has-tur n_575761.html (discussing Tebow's popularity before he
was even drafted in NFL).
284. See id. (declaring that Tebow has been flooded with endorsement offers
because of his immense popularity and has even turned down lucrative deals).

285. See Neal J. Leitereg, Philadelphia76ers Rookie Evan TrunerInks Deal with LiNing, HULIQ (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.huliq.com/10164/philadelphia-76ers-
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John Wall, the number one overall pick in the 2010 NBA Draft who
played one season at the University of Kentucky, reportedly signed
a five-year endorsement deal with Reebok worth $25 million. 28 6
Furthermore, in the 2008 NFL Draft, Nike signed "nine out of the
top 11 draft picks" to endorsement deals before any of these former
college athletes played a down in the NFL. 287 Nike and Reebok
undoubtedly made an initial investment in these former college
standouts because they believe that many of these athletes will become successful professional players. 2 88 Nevertheless, as evidenced
by Tim Tebow, numerous star college athletes are extremely marketable without playing professionally because of the commercialization of college sports and the large fan bases of college teams.28 9
It seems likely that many student-athletes would not receive lucrative endorsement deals, as marketing potential usually coincides
with popularity derived from success on the playing field. 29 0 Student-athletes, who are most likely to be courted by sports agents,
usually represent those college athletes who have the most success
at the college level, and are, the most marketable players. 29' Thus,
student-athletes who would not be able to attain endorsement deals
rookie-evan-turner-inks-endorsement-deal-li-ning (stating that Evan Turner, 2010
NCAA Player of Year, signed endorsement deal with Li-Ning to boost image in
global community).
286. See id. (stating thatJohn Wall also signed lucrative endorsement contract
with Reebok); see also Neal Leitereg, No.1 Overall Pick john Wall Signs Exclusive Trading CardDeal with PaniniAmerica, EXAMINER (Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.examiner.

com/nba-draft-in-national/no-1-overall-pick-john-wall-signs-exclusive-trading-carddeal-with-panini-america (declaring that Wall also signed trading card endorsement deal in addition to his lucrative deal with Reebok).
287. See Quibian Salazar-Moreno, Nike, Reebok Get Busy Signing NFL Draft rookies
to Endorsement Deals, AOL (Apr. 29, 2008, 8:06 AM), http://www.bvonsports.com/
2008/04/29/nike-reebok-get-busy-signing-nfl-draft-rookies-to-endorsement-d/ (declaring that newly drafted NFL first-round picks received big endorsement deals
after teams selected them, as Nike plans to have players such as Darren McFadden
wear Nike gear from "head-to-toe").
288. See Leitereg, supra note 285 (stating that Li-Ning signed Turner for his
tremendous potential to be star in NBA and thus become even more marketable).
289. See Edelman, supra note 5, at 887 ("Star college players have similar
name recognition as professional players and are therefore almost as
marketable.").
290. See Aaronson, supra note 162 ("California State University-San Marcos
economist Robert Brown told ESPN.com for a December 2009 story that the average NFL-bound college football player would be worth $1.3 million to $1.36 million per season to his school 'if the college game were subject to market forces
similar to those that govern the NFL.' Former Florida quarterback Tim Tebow, he
said, would likely be paid more than $2.5 million.").
291. See Brad Pinkerton, Inside Pitch: Bush Ahead of NFL Rookies in Endorsement
Game, SPORTS BUSINESs DAILY (Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.

com/article/105634 (stating that Bush, who was recent focus of investigations relating to improper agent contact with players, led rookies in endorsement deals).
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due to a lack of success on the field would most likely not be the
types of players contacted by sports agents."' 2
In the current state of college athletics, numerous student-athletes come from economically poor backgrounds and have little
spending money despite their popularity and success. 293 Even
though the NCAA has begun to investigate schools more thoroughly in recent years, college athletes continue to accept financial
compensation from sports agents because the amount of compensation given to these players is still worth the risk of NCAA suspension.29 4 With lucrative endorsement deals available to many
players, though, the temptation of such improper benefits would
dramatically decrease if student-athletes were able to earn significantly more money through endorsement deals than from benefits
given by agents. 29 5 In other words, for many student-athletes, the
risk/reward relationship currently weighs in favor of accepting benefits from sports agents because these student-athletes have no
other source of income. 296 If student-athletes were able to receive
endorsement deals worth six or even seven figures in some circum292. For a discussion of how only those players receiving endorsement deals
would be courted by unethical sports agents, see supra notes 290-291 and accompany text.
293. See Anthony Jerrod, Are College Athletes Being Pimped by Agents and the
NCAA?, ATLANTA POST (Sept. 15, 2010), http://atlantapost.com/2010/09/15/arecollege-athletes-being-pimped-by-agents-and-the-ncaa/ ("It is safe to state that most
stars in the big-money college sports such as football and basketball are AfricanAmerican athletes who evolve from low-income and lower middle class status."); see
also Dohrmann, supra note 183 (telling story of sports agentJohn Luchs who stated
that he paid players who needed money because of family illnesses, credit card
debt, and other family financial problems); see also Frank Deford, Awful Injustice:
It's Time to Pay Revenue-Earning College Athletes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 2, 2008),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/frank-deford/01/02/paid.athletes/ (mentioning that college basketball and football players are normally "poor
African-Americans").
294. SeeJerrod, supra note 293 (stating that it is extremely difficult for poor
college athletes to turn down money from agents when NCAA profits at their expense); see also Therber, supra note 4 (alleging that student-athletes would believe
taking money from agents is too much of risk if college athletes actually believed
NCAA would catch them and declare them ineligible); see also Rosenberg, supra
note 199 (contending that good system of enforcement catches enough people to
be large deterrent for others thinking of committing violation, but implying that
NCAA will not be able to achieve such enforcement system).
295. Compare Edelman, supra note 5, at 887 (stating that Tracy McGrady received $12 million in endorsements right out of high school) with Newberry, supra
note 208 (stating that Green only received $1,000 for jersey given to agent).
296. SeeJeff Eisenberg, Maryland's Gary Williams Says College Athletes Should Be
Paid, RIVALS (Sept. 22, 2007), http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/basketball/blog/
the-dagger/post/Maryland-s-Gary-Williams-says-college-athletes-s?urn=ncaab-2717
21 (noting Maryland basketball coach Gary Williams's opinion that some poor
players are even tempted by $100).
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stances, the risk of the NCAA suspending student-athletes for sev-

eral games would not be worth the thousands of dollars given by
sports agents. 2 9 7

2.

Avoiding Legal and PracticalConsequences of Other StudentProposals

In addition to reducing the incentives of many student-athletes
to engage in improper behavior with sports agents, the endorsement deal scheme also avoids the problems associated with the
other payment proposals.2 9 8 In regard to the financial concerns relating to the pay-for-play proposal and the revenue-sharing scheme,
allowing student-athletes to accept endorsement deals would do little, if anything, to diminish the revenues generated by college ath-

letic programs.29 9 In contrast to the other payments models, the
endorsement plan does not rely on money generated from university sports programs.30o Although numerous colleges and university
athletic programs rely on endorsement deals as well, it seems unlikely that companies like Nike and Adidas would decrease the
amount of funds they spend on schools.30" Colleges and universities mainly receive endorsement contracts for placing a company's
logo on school athletic uniforms whereas student-athletes would
most likely receive endorsement deals for promotional
commercials.30 2
297. See Edelman, supra note 5, at 885 (asserting that it would take considerable amount of money to eliminate temptations by agents).
298. For a discussion of how the endorsement plan avoids both practical and
legal problems that plague other payment proposals, see infra notes 299-318 and
accompanying text.
299. See Edelman, supra note 5, at 880 (stating that deregulation would not
affect university money because schools gain money from other sources).
300. For a further discussion on the endorsement deal scheme to seek promotional opportunities, see infra notes 302-304 and accompanying text.
301. See Rachel Bachman, Lucrative Deals with Nike Adidas Another Battle Between College 'Haves,' 'Have Nots,' OREGONIAN (June 5, 2010), http://
blog.oregonlive.com/pacl0/2010/06/lucrative deals-withnikeadid.html (asserting that endorsement deals for college athletic programs are result of fan base,
tradition, winning percentage, and market share where companies have ability to
"sell official team gear" and "shape a team's image"); see also Mike Fish, Wat Price
Glory? The Star's Value, ESPN (Dec. 11, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/
otl/news/story?page=fish/091211 (arguing that increased marketability of players
can increase endorsement deals for organizations, as Michael Jordan's "presence
led to new sponsorship deals for the team").
302. See Notre Dame Signs 10-year Deal with Adidas, supra note 253 (stating that
Notre Dame receives money from Adidas in exchange for all twenty-six Notre
Dame varsity sports wearing Adidas logo on uniforms); see also Bachman, supra
note 301 (discussing actual reasons why companies attempt to contract into endorsement deals with college athletic programs); see also RICHARD L. IRWIN, WILLIAM A. SUrrON & LARRY M. MCCARTHY, SPORTS PROMOTION AND SALES
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Furthermore, unlike other payment options, the endorsement
plan does not violate Title IX.303 The endorsement plan does not
create an environment where schools treat women's sports unfairly
because it does not require schools to compensate athletes unequally, as the endorsement plan excludes participation of
schools. 3 04 Moreover, by changing its regulations to allow athletes
to seek endorsement opportunities, the NCAA effectively creates
endorsement opportunities for both male and female athletes.3 05
In professional sports, female athletes have proven that they have
311
just as much star-power and marketability as male athletes. " Female tennis star Maria Sharapova earned an estimated $23 million
in endorsement deals in 2010, and also signed a contract with Nike
worth reportedly $70 million over 8 years. 0 7 Additionally, Danica
Patrick has become the most popular driver on the Indy Car Series,
earning $12 million in 2010, much of which was due to endorse" Thus, even if Title IX did
ment deals with various companies. 11
apply to the endorsement plan, such a proposal would likely not
violate the Act. 30 9
Without accepting wages from universities, student-athletes
would not be considered "employees" of the schools for which they
play.3 10 Consequently, colleges and universities would avoid any
type of workers' compensation payments or collective bargaining
ed. 2007) (explaining that arrangements between athletes
and sponsors usually entail athlete endorsing sponsor's product and promoting it
so that product grows in popularity).
303. See Edelman, supra note 5, at 880 (stating that deregulation of amateurism ideals, which includes allowance of endorsement deals, complies with Title
IX).
304. See id. at 888 ("[D]eregulation does not involve any payment from educational institutions to student-athletes, and therefore is free from the regulation's
scope.").
305. See Edelman, supra note 5, at 888 (asserting that deregulation would include opportunities for women to receive endorsement deals).
306. See Kurt Badenhausen, The World's Highest-Paid Female Athletes, FORHS
(Aug. 27, 2010), http://english.sina.com/sports/p/2010/0827/336458.html
(proving that women are some of highest paid athletes in world in regard to endorsements); see also Craig T. Bogar, Trends in Product Endorsement by Athletes,
MANAGEMENT 151 (2d

SPORTs DIGEST,

http://thesportdigest.com/article/trends-product-endorsements-

athletes (last visited Oct. 21, 2011) (noting that Michelle Wie has surpassed most
male athletes in money from endorsement deals).
307. See Badenhausen, supra note 306 (demonstrating tremendous amount of
money made by Sharapova as result of endorsement deals).
308. See id. (discussing Patrick's celebrity status as female auto-racer).
309. See id. (showing that women athletes can generate large quantities of
money as popular athletes).
310. See Edelman, supra note 5, at 885-88 (stating that deregulation, which
includes endorsement deals, would not create employee/employer relationship
between student-athletes and universities).
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agreements that could arise if the student-athletes were wage earners.31 1 This type of plan also prevents schools from being vicariously liable for actions by student-athletes. 3 12
Finally, the NCAA and its colleges and universities would still
maintain tax-exempt status under the endorsement proposal.3 13
First, the IRS is not likely to consider the revenue generated by college sports as "business income" because schools would still not be
paying student-athletes to compete in college athletics. 3 14 Second,
the NCAA would also maintain its tax-exempt status as an "amateur
athletic organization."3 15 Although the NCAA imposes strict guidelines to ensure qualification as an amateur organization, other similar organizations to the NCAA with less stringent guidelines retain
amateur organization status under the IRC.31 6
As one legal sports scholar has asserted, organizations only
clearly conflict with amateurism if they "are paying athletes a substantial formal salary for their play."3 17 For instance, the United

States Olympic Committee ("USOC"), which qualifies as a tax-exempt organization because it "foster [s] national or international
amateur sports competition," allows professional basketball and
hockey players who make millions of dollars to participate in the

Olympic games.3 18 Moreover, in 2007, the USOC made approxi311. See Hurst, supra note 216, at 66 (declaring that lack of compensation by
schools precludes student-athletes from being employees of their schools); see also
Mondello, supranote 76, at 300 (asserting that universities would probably only be
considered "employers" of student-athletes and, thus, responsible for workers'
compensation payments for student-athletics if these schools began paying
players).
312. See Hurst, supra note 216, at 76 (stating that lack of employer classification eliminates vicarious liability theory).
313. For an explanation of how the NCAA would retain tax-exempt status
even with implementation of endorsement deal plan, see infra notes 314-320 and
accompany text.
314. For a discussion of why universities could lose tax-exempt status from
paying student-athletes, see infra notes 314-320 and accompany text.
315. See Fitt, supra note 20, at 585 (asserting that to qualify as amateur athletic
organization, it must be "organized and operated exclusively to foster national or
international amateur sports competition if such organization is also organized
and operated primarily to conduct national or international competition in sports
or to support and develop amateur athletes for national or international competition in sports"). I.R.C. § 501(j).
316. See Fitt, supra note 20, at 582-83 (asserting that many Olympic related
organizations keep tax-exempt status despite having less stringent amateur guidelines than NCAA).
317. Id. at 582-83.
318. See Why is the U.S. Olympic Committee Tax-Exempt?, URBAN

INSTITUTE

(Feb.

26, 2010, 13:59 EST), http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/blog/_archives/2010/2/
26/4466190.html (noting that Olympic Committee remains exempt from taxes because of its designation as organization that fosters amateur sports competition
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mately $147 million, and roughly 67% of that revenue paid administrative expenses and salaries.3 19 Nevertheless, the USOC still
maintains tax-exempt status because it does not pay salaries to the
athletes participating in the Olympics, even though these athletes
are nearly all professionals.3 20
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

Amid tremendous controversy and criticism regarding his alleged acceptance of benefits from a sports agent as a student-athlete, Reggie Bush returned his Heisman Trophy to the Heisman
Trophy Trust on September 14, 2010.321 Realizing the great temptation facing college athletes with little money, Bush expressed his
desire "to establish an educational program which will assist student-athletes and their families [in] avoid[ing] the mistakes that
[he] made."3 22 Bush, however, is only one of many examples of student-athletes taking money from sports agents, and NCAA officials
are just now discovering how deeply unethical agents have penetrated the college sports world. 323 Despite having state laws in fortytwo states prohibiting improper contact between agents and student-athletes, "more than half of [these states] have yet to revoke or
suspend a single license, or invoke penalties of any sort."3 24 Although the NCAA has begun to take steps to combat agent influence in the NCAA, eradication of this problem will only come with

despite fact that overwhelming majority of Olympians are actually professional
athletes).
319. See id. (showing breakdown of Olympic revenue).
320. See id. (discussing how USOC does not pay taxes to IRS); see also Analyzing
NCAA Hypocrisy: Root Cause and Solutions, supra note 209 ("The Olympics figured
this situation out a long time ago and adjusted 'amateurism' to ... allowing [athletes] to receive money from other sources. The NCAA does not need to do things
the same as the Olympics, but it is a model for ideas.").
321. See Bill Pennington, Reggie Bush, Ineligible for '05, Returns Heisman, N.Y.
TiMEs (Sept.14, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/15/sports/ncaafootball/15heisman.html?_r=1 (discussing travesty Bush created and consequences he
must now pay).
322. Id.
323. See Report: Agent, Coach Have FinancialTies, ESPN (Sept. 30, 2010), http:/
/sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5631748 (discussing relationship between former North Carolina assistant football coach and sports agent).
324. See Bob Stoops: Amnesty for Some Players,supra note 178 (demonstrating that
state laws have done little to deter agents from giving benefits to student-athletes).
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removal of player temptations, which can most easily be accomplished by allowing players to seek endorsement deals.3 2 5
Michael A. Corgan*
325. See Tanner, supra note 2 (noting that paying student-athletes is best way
to reduce temptation of athletes taking money from "unscrupulous agents"); see
also Edelman, supra note 5, at 880 (asserting that proposals to pay students - both
revenue sharing scheme and laundry money stipend - would reach "sub-optimal
outcomes" for colleges and NCAA). For an explanation of why the endorsement
deal model escapes problems of other payment proposals, see supra notes 298-320.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 2009.
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